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Many scholars and policy makers celebrate cities as loci for addressing climate
change. In addition to being significant sources of carbon pollution, cities prove to
be dynamic sites of experimentation and ambition on climate policy. However, as
U.S. cities set climate change goals far above those of their federal and state coun-
terparts, they are butting up against the limits of their existing legal authority, most
notably with regard to control over energy supplies. In response, many U.S. cities
are exercising their legal rights to reclaim public ownership or control over private
electric utilities as a method of achieving their climate change goals.
Although there is widespread desire for cities to act within their legal authority to
reduce carbon pollution, it is a different question entirely whether they should be
encouraged to expand this authority by reclaiming ownership or control over tasks
previously outsourced to private companies. On this question, energy law has much
to learn from administrative law’s robust attention to outsourcing theory. This
Article draws from the outsourcing literature to argue that climate change compli-
cates traditional theories regarding whether cities should prefer publicly or privately
owned electricity systems. By transposing these theories into energy law, it con-
structs a theoretical defense of why more public forms of energy ownership or con-
trol may be effective governance tools for the climate change era. In the last
century, providing electricity was a task well suited to government oversight of pri-
vate companies, as regulators primarily aimed to incentivize low prices and ade-
quate supply. This century, however, climate change creates the need for more
deliberative, experimental management of electricity to meet the additional aim of
decarbonization while maintaining affordability and reliability. In this situation,
outsourcing theory widely counsels against utilizing a private contractor model,
and illustrates the difficulties inherent in using regulation to manage private compa-
nies. Instead, it is time for broader reconsideration of more public forms of energy
control and ownership, of just the sort that leading U.S. cities are pioneering.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, the area around Boulder, Colorado received
as much rainfall in three days as it typically does in an entire year.1
Floods swept through the city and surrounding towns, destroying
thousands of homes, damaging tens of thousands more, and washing
out miles of road.2 In the days and weeks following the floods, hun-
dreds of stories detailed how residents came together to help families
1 See Charlie Brennan & John Aguilar, Eight Days, 1,000-Year Rain, 100-Year Flood,
DAILY CAMERA (Sept. 21, 2013, 7:49:24 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder-
flood/ci_24148258/boulder-county-colorado-flood-2013-survival-100-rain-100-year-flood
(quoting the National Weather Service as describing how “[s]ome areas were getting close
to their annual rainfall in a three-day period”).
2 See Amanda Paulson, For Colorado’s ‘Biblical’ Floods, Numbers Tell Astonishing
Tale, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/
0918/For-Colorado-s-biblical-floods-numbers-tell-astonishing-tale-video (describing the
damage caused by floods).
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in need.3 Two months later, the city came together in a different way:
During a November 2013 referendum, Boulder residents exercised
their legal right to “municipalize” electricity service by voting
resoundingly in favor of assuming public ownership of the city’s elec-
tricity infrastructure.4 This timing suggests that whether or not scien-
tists attribute Boulder’s floods to climate change,5 residents drew a
link6: their aim in voting to municipalize was to respond to climate
change more quickly than Colorado or the United States as a whole
are willing to do.7
3 See, e.g., Amy Bounds, In Midst of Disaster, Boulder County Rises, DAILY CAMERA
(Sept. 28, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder-flood/ci_24185220/
boulder-flood (“As many stories as there are of destruction and narrow escapes from
raging water or mudslides across Colorado’s Front Range, there are even more of
neighborhoods banding together or strangers lending a hand . . . .”); Amanda Paulson,
Heroes of the Colorado Floods: Tales of Bravery by Neighbors and Strangers, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0918/Heroes-of-the-
Colorado-floods-Tales-of-bravery-by-neighbors-and-strangers (describing stories of
residents coming together to help those affected by the flood).
4 Boulder residents voted 66.5% in favor of Ballot Question 2E, a City
Council–backed proposal for structuring and limiting city debt resulting from
municipalization, and rejected by 69.9% the utility-proposed Question 310, which would
have placed greater restrictions on municipalization. See Erica Meltzer, Boulder Utility
Clears Hurdle as Voters Reject Xcel-Backed Question 310, DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 5, 2013,
6:49 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/boulder-election-news/ci_24459325/boulder-ballot-
issue-310-2e-municipalization (ballot results); 2013 Ballot, CITY OF BOULDER COLO.,
https://bouldercolorado.gov/elections/2013-ballot (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (ballots). Prior
to the floods, a 2011 ballot initiative beginning the municipalization process passed by only
a narrow margin. See Stephanie Simon, Boulder Votes for Municipal Utility, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577014231689288
216 (“Voters in Boulder, Colo., narrowly backed the creation of a municipal power
authority to replace Xcel Energy Inc., the biggest electricity provider in Colorado.”).
5 Compare Stephanie C. Herring et al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2013 from a
Climate Perspective, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y (Am. Meteorological Soc’y,
Boulder, Co.), Sept. 2014, at S1, S18 (“[T]he occurrence of extreme five-day rainfall over
northeast Colorado during September 2013 was not made more likely, or more intense, by
the effects of climate change.”), with Kevin E. Trenberth, John T. Fasullo & Theodore G.
Shepherd, Attribution of Climate Extreme Events, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 725, 725
(2015) (linking Boulder’s 2013 flooding to high sea surface temperatures with “a
discernable human component”).
6 This timing only suggests potential correlation, and can’t be taken as proof of
causation, of course.
7 Boulder aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions at least 80% below 2005 levels
by 2050—a more ambitious aim than the current U.S. pledge to achieve around a 27%
reduction from 2005 levels by 2025. See CITY OF BOULDER, BOULDER’S CLIMATE
COMMITMENT 4 (2015), https://www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/Boulder_Climate_
Commitment_Doc-1-201510231704.pdf (Boulder’s emission reduction target); United
States of America, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:03:15 PM), http://
www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20
States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompany
ing%20Information.pdf (the United States’ emission reduction target); see also Meltzer,
supra note 4 (quoting Boulder’s mayor as explaining that the municipalization effort “is
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By claiming control over its energy supply, Boulder is contra-
vening a century-long literature and seemingly linear history away
from municipalization, towards public utility commission oversight of
private electric companies, as the best way to run electric utilities.
Why does it think it can enter the technical field of utility manage-
ment and outperform the dominant model of electric utility regulation
in the United States?
This Article argues that climate change complicates the tradi-
tional assumption that privately owned electric utilities, driven by
profit motives and cabined by regulatory oversight, can most effec-
tively and efficiently run our electricity system. Drawing from the
growing field of outsourcing literature within administrative law, this
Article suggests that many of the criteria that make outsourcing
acceptable in certain fields are increasingly lacking in the electricity
sector. In particular, climate change alters the assumption that there is
a Weberian, apolitical “management” aspect to electric utilities that
exists apart from significant political decisions that must be made
about how to transform the electricity grid in the coming decades.8
Electricity regulation’s increasingly multifaceted aims and experi-
mental nature suggest strong theoretical reasons to prefer more public
forms of energy ownership or control in the climate change era.
Boulder’s aims in municipalizing are unusual. The few cities that
have municipalized in recent decades have done so predominantly to
cut costs, not to accomplish wider policy objectives like mitigating cli-
mate change.9 But Boulder is not alone in its desire to reclaim public
ownership as a method of implementing social policy: its efforts
accord both with the Progressive-era history of municipalization in the
United States, and with the efforts of several contemporary cities.
Minneapolis, Davis, and Santa Fe have joined Boulder in considering
about our environmental and economic future” and that “[t]his conversation has to
continue, and if it can’t continue in Boulder, where can it continue?”).
8 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 218 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922) (observing that legal
authority in the bureaucratic context is legitimated by the existence of a sphere of
jurisdiction where “the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is
subject to definite conditions”).
9 See, e.g., Suedeen G. Kelly, Municipalization of Electricity: The Allure of Lower
Rates for Bright Lights in Big Cities, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 43, 43 (1997) (explaining that
33 cities in the early 1990s “seriously considered electric municipalization” as a way to
“lower electric rates by taking advantage of changes made in 1992 to federal law that make
it easier to procure cheaper, wholesale electric power”); Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent
Domain, Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1505, 1508 (2005) [hereinafter Saxer, Eminent Domain] (“Municipalization has occurred
with electric distribution systems as municipalities have pursued lower electric rates and
improved service reliability.”).
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full city ownership.10 Chicago, San Francisco, San Diego and hundreds
of smaller communities are considering or have adopted climate-ori-
ented “community choice aggregation” (CCA) programs.11 In these
programs, the city acts as electricity supplier—making all purchasing
decisions and perhaps owning some generation—although not grid
owner.12 In both of these models, cities are reclaiming legal control
over previously privatized utility functions in order to meet decarboni-
zation goals—that is, goals to reduce their levels of carbon pollution in
order to respond to the problem of climate change.13
Scholars and policy makers widely agree that cities “can con-
tribute meaningfully to U.S. climate change mitigation by reducing
emissions within their well-accepted domains of power.”14 Cities
10 See infra Sections II.C, V.B (describing such efforts in Minneapolis, Santa Fe and
Boulder); see also Staff Report from Steve Pinkerton, City Manager, to Davis City Council
(Oct. 23, 2012) (on file with author) (describing such efforts in Davis).
11 See infra notes 222–30 and accompanying text.
12 In CCAs, the city reclaims authority over contracting for electricity supply—
including decisions regarding purchase price and sources—while continuing to rely upon
the private utility to deliver purchased electricity to customers and to maintain the
electricity grid. For more detail, see infra Section II.D.
13 Other countries are also experiencing movements towards public ownership. Most
notably, activists across Germany have remunicipalized more than 70 local utilities since
2007, also largely in a push to address climate change more effectively. See Jeevan Vasagar,
German Grids Restored to Public Ownership, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.ft
.com/cms/s/0/2f3b0b1e-4dee-11e3-8fa5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4IomI8LHb (describing
Hamburg’s vote on whether to return to public ownership as “the latest evidence of a trend
that has seen dozens of energy grids in Germany restored to municipal ownership”). Public
ownership models also exist at the national scale in many countries, although there has
been a trend away from national ownership, towards privatization, in recent decades. See
Frank A. Wolak, Regulating Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply (noting
deregulation of state-owned electricity industries in England, Wales, Norway, Sweden,
Spain, Australia, and New Zealand beginning in the late 1980s), in ECONOMIC
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 195, 201 (Nancy L. Rose ed.,
2014). See generally DAVID M. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND
REGULATION OF NETWORK UTILITIES (1999) (providing an analysis of privatization versus
regulation of network utilities).
14 Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 677 (2010) [hereinafter
Trisolini, All Hands on Deck]; see also PONTIFICAL ACAD. OF SCI. & SOC. SCI., MODERN
SLAVERY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE COMMITMENT OF THE CITIES (2015), http://
www.pass.va/content/dam/scienzesociali/booklet/declaration21july2015.pdf (gathering
signatures of mayors at Vatican-sponsored event who expressed a commitment to ending
climate change and modern slavery); Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and
Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered
Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11161, 11161 (2009) (“In order to preserve
the local autonomy values that underlie local action, and to capture the benefits of
regulatory experimentation that result from it, federal climate change law should grant an
agency . . . the discretion to approve local climate action plans that include measures that
surpass federal ceilings.”); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What
Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does
This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006)
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house over 80% of the U.S. population15 and contribute somewhere
between 30% and 75% of global carbon dioxide emissions.16 They
also prove key sites of democratic contestation and expression of pop-
ular will on climate change, with many cities adopting decarbonization
goals far above those of their state or federal counterparts.17
But as U.S. cities adopt more ambitious climate aims, many are
butting up against the limits of their existing legal authority, most
notably with regard to control over energy supplies. 18 In response, no
doubt more cities will take steps of the type Boulder is pioneering:
(describing how states have taken the initiative in addressing climate change and analyzing
the consequences of these state activities); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption,
and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 280–88 (2009) (providing institutional justifications
for local control and describing ongoing, ambitious local actions to address climate
change); Daniel C. Esty & Rudy Provoost, Shifting Gears on Climate Change,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-c-esty/
shifting-gears-on-climate-change_b_8167428.html (“[A]ny new commitment to action must
include broadened ‘ownership’ of the climate change agenda and efforts to highlight
progress particularly at the city, state/province, and corporate scales.”). See generally
Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs.
Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008) (arguing for a pluralist architecture of
climate law in which cities and states play important roles alongside international and
countrywide actors).
15 U.S. Census Bureau, Frequently Asked Questions , U.S. CENSUS, https://
ask.census.gov/faq.php?id=5000&faqId=5971 (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (“The urban areas
of the United States for the 2010 Census contain 249,253,271 people, representing 80.7% of
the population . . . .”).
16 Compare UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CITIES AND BUILDINGS 1 (n.d.)
(estimating that cities are responsible for 75% of global carbon dioxide emissions), with
David Satterthwaite, Cities’ Contribution to Global Warming: Notes on the Allocation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 20 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 539, 543–44 (2008) (suggesting
that cities account for only 30% to 40% of emissions, and explaining reasons for variation
in estimates).
17 See Part IV.B.
18 States also face challenges regarding their ability to legally control climate change in
the electric sector, which is governed largely at the regional and federal levels. See Joel B.
Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author)
(explaining how recent Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Federal Power Act
may provide new limitations for state control of emissions from the electricity sector). Such
state-level challenges may become more acute following two Supreme Court decisions,
issued in the most recent Term, that endorse a broad reach for federal electricity regulation
and grant preemptive effects to such regulations. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC,
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297–98 (2016) (finding that federal law preempted an attempt by
Maryland to provide an incentive to locate generation in the state that was conditional on
the generator’s participation in federal electricity markets); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016) (holding that FERC had authority to regulate any
practices “directly affecting” wholesale rates, even if these touched on matters traditionally
under state jurisdiction). Nevertheless, cities struggle more than states in controlling
emissions because state control over cities is near absolute, whereas federal control over
states is constitutionally and statutorily circumscribed. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2278 (2003) (describing home rule).
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increasing their legal leverage over the problem of climate change by
drawing more emissions within their control. This expansion raises an
underexplored conundrum. Although there is widespread desire for
cities to act within their legal authority to reduce carbon pollution, it is
a different question entirely whether they should be encouraged to
expand this authority by reclaiming ownership or control over tasks
currently managed by private entities.19
This Article finds good reason for cities’ movement in this direc-
tion. Leading theorists of outsourcing suggest that it is most appro-
priate for tasks of “pure operational efficiency,” where “the ends are
established and it’s down to a question of means.”20 Electricity fit this
mold reasonably well during the last century, when the primary aim of
energy regulation was to supply ample power at low cost—a task reg-
ulators easily translated into a mandate for private entities. But cli-
mate change creates difficult and inherently political tradeoffs among
the goals of reducing carbon, maintaining reliable electricity supply,
and preserving the affordability of power.21 Optimizing these many
factors simultaneously is impossible, such that continuous tradeoffs
and recalibrations are necessary. Consequently, the ends-means dis-
tinction that electricity regulators have relied on for the last century—
where clear-cut regulatory goals are translated into established utility
rates and responsibilities—no longer functions well. Under these cir-
19 In using the term “reclaiming,” I do not mean that all cities now considering public
ownership at one point in the past provisioned their own electricity. I use “reclaim” to
indicate that there is movement back towards the robust debate that preoccupied many
thinkers around the turn of the twentieth century as to whether electricity should be
publicly or privately provided. See infra Section II.B (discussing this debate). However, the
applicability of the framework provided by the contracting out literature, in my view, does
not hinge on any presupposition that a service was historically publicly provided and has
since been contracted out. Instead, this literature provides a general framework for
assessing the relative merits of public versus private provisioning.
20 John D. Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences,
and Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 41, 44 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); see JOHN D. DONAHUE,
THE WARPING OF GOVERNMENT WORK 109 (2008) (suggesting that government should
control “custom tasks” that are difficult to pre-specify or evaluate). But see Steven J.
Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law Concerns: A
Contracting Management Perspective (discussing circumstances in which “contracting
creates transaction costs outweighing its product-cost benefits”), in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT, supra, at 153, 156; Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of
Public Action: An Introduction (explaining how direct governance enhances effectiveness
and accountability), in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 1, 31, 37–38 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
21 See Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility
Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals,
38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter Monast & Adair, Triple Bottom Line]
(exploring “opportunities and challenges to aligning” these goals).
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cumstances, outsourcing theory counsels against continued
privatization.
The legal academy is not blind to the challenges that climate
change poses for regulating electric utilities, and there is widespread
agreement that the current model of electricity regulation is inade-
quate for the task.22 However, energy law scholars have confined
themselves to questions of how to improve the public-private partner-
ship, rather than rethinking it. Two solutions predominate: The first
focuses on redesigning energy markets to make them more attuned to
the challenges of climate change.23 The second questions the ability of
electricity markets to accomplish an energy transition on the scale that
will be necessary to address climate change. Instead, and as most
22 See, e.g., id. at 4 (proposing a framework to help regulators balance competing
objectives); see also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1614, 1619 (2014) (arguing that the notion of public utility must be revitalized to meet
the challenges of decarbonizing electricity); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of
Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV.
810, 814 (2016) (arguing that ratemaking innovations will be critical to promote
“technological innovation and deployment” in the electricity grid); Joel B. Eisen, An Open
Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 1712, 1717 (2014) [hereinafter Eisen, Open Access] (asserting that a new “open
access” mode of regulation is needed to create a smart electricity network); Emily
Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 141, 143, 146 (2016) (arguing that energy policy “struggles to reconcile” competing
visions for the future of electricity and needs an “integrative framework”); Sharon B.
Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 521 (explaining how consumer-sited
generation “challenges traditional energy law paradigms” and creates puzzles within
energy law); Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving
State and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1619
(2014) (charting the difficulty of balancing federal and state regulatory roles in addressing
climate change); Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
371, 400–12 (2014) (exploring changes needed in the goals and structure of public utility
regulation to address climate change).
23 See, e.g., Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC
Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 278 (2014) (urging FERC
to incorporate environmental considerations into market design); Eisen, Open Access,
supra note 22, at 1717 (arguing that “a regulatory open access principle will eventually be
necessary”); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1786 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority]
(urging FERC to consider adopting a “carbon adder” to market pricing); Hammond &
Spence, supra note 22, at 193–201 (suggesting several market reforms that would better
reflect the grid value of low-carbon energy); John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change,
Electric Markets and the FERC, 35 ENERGY L.J. 345, 347–48 (2014) (arguing that FERC
should focus on reforming subsidies and creating resource neutrality to combat climate
change); see also STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, BERKELEY & ENERGY CLIMATE
INST., ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 2 (2014)
(providing an overview of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan).
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notably articulated by William Boyd, this camp argues for a reinvigo-
ration of the concept of “public utility” within electricity regulation, so
as to give regulators more capacious authority to regulate privately
owned utility companies in the public interest.24
In contrast, no scholar has yet devoted attention to the viability
of returning to more public forms of utility control as a way to effec-
tively govern electric utilities in the climate change era.25 Robust as
outsourcing theory has recently been within administrative law,26 it
has made little mark upon the field of public utility law. Yet one way
to think of electricity today is as a long-outsourced function, with pri-
vate suppliers managed under an elaborate regime of governmental
legal control. Reconceptualizing energy regulation in this manner, and
transposing onto it important developments in outsourcing theory,
gives us new insight into the ideal structure of utility regulation in a
climate changed world. And as this Article describes below in Section
IV.B, not only bureaucratic theory, but the climate leadership of sev-
eral municipally owned utilities, suggest the promise that public
energy holds. This Article provides a focused examination of Austin,
24 See Boyd, supra note 22; see also Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 841–77 (charting
how various states are using their regulatory authority to experiment on decarbonization
initiatives); Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change
Mitigation, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 71 (2012) (arguing for an enhanced role for
state regulators in addressing climate change); Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade
(or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon
Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 405, 413 (2009) (expressing
skepticism that market reforms can adequately respond to climate change); Monast &
Adair, Triple Bottom Line, supra note 21, at 4 (proposing a “‘triple bottom line approach’
to state utility regulation” to achieve an alignment of “state energy, environmental, and
consumer protection goals within the current regulatory system”).
25 Few recent articles have even addressed municipal power. One notable exception is
an article by Uma Outka, accepted for publication around the same time as this one, which
also explores the role of city ownership in decarbonizing the grid. See Uma Outka, Cities
and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105 (2016). Outka’s article provides rich detail on
the legal context in which cities are attempting to reclaim ownership, whereas this article
focuses on the theoretical context surrounding such city movements. See id. For additional
(relatively) recent articles that more generally examine municipalization, see Alan
Richardson & John Kelly, The Relevance and Importance of Public Power in the United
States, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 54, 54 (2005), in which the authors discuss the history
of public power in the United States and its relevance for the future, as well as Saxer,
Eminent Domain, supra note 9, which explores federal constraints on eminent domain
power, and Shelley Ross Saxer, Government Power Unleashed: Using Eminent Domain to
Acquire a Public Utility or Other Ongoing Enterprise, 38 IND. L. REV. 55 (2005)
[hereinafter Saxer, Government Power Unleashed], which explores Fifth Amendment, state
constitutional, and statutory constraints on eminent domain power. Saxer’s work focuses
on legal constraints to municipalization. Trisolini and Jacobs both take note of the role of
municipalized utilities in addressing climate change, but do not explore the movement in
this direction in any detail. See generally Trisolini, All Hands on Deck, supra note 14;
Jacobs, supra note 22.
26 See infra Section I.A.
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but one might also include on this list Sacramento, Seattle, San
Antonio, and Burlington.27 These cities, which have long-municipal-
ized electricity supplies, are leaders and innovators in decarbonizing
electricity. Their performance bolsters the theoretical claim that
public forms of ownership and control are compelling governance
tools for the climate change era.
As discussed so far, my argument might be taken as a step down
the road to nationalization: After all, if public ownership is better at
the city level, why stop there? I cabin my claims specifically to the
local level, as I see publicly controlled utilities as a useful antidote to,
and check on, private utilities in a climate changing world, rather than
as a realistic whole-cloth replacement. It is worth taking seriously the
literature showing that there are efficiency and innovation gains from
contracting out and privatization.28 But climate change causes these
gains to be counter-balanced by the need to have at least some pub-
licly controlled models across the country, unimpeded by the myriad
challenges of the regulator-regulated relationship, to demonstrate the
possibilities that exist for decarbonizing electricity supply. In turn, pri-
vate competitors can act as a benchmark against which to check the
potential inefficiencies of public models.29 In addition, municipaliza-
tion and CCA hold another distinct advantage over state or national-
level ownership or control: These local efforts harness the remarkable
drive of some cities to go beyond the predictions of rational choice
theory,30 and above and beyond their surrounding states and country,
27 See infra notes 347–53.
28 See, e.g., William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey
of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 329–30 (2001) (highlighting
economic theory that predicts substantial gains from privatization in competitive and
potentially competitive markets); Mary Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public Versus Private
Ownership: The Current State of the Debate 52–53 (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2420, 2000), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/952171468766218935/
pdf/multi-page.pdf (similar).
29 Cf. William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 23, 33 (arguing that the history of U.S.
policy shows a need to balance public and private, to check organized power against
organized power).
30 Rational choice theory—the belief that persons make choices based on rational
predictions of their expected individual gains—would predict that cities would not act to
cut emissions absent credible commitments from other governments. See, e.g., Thomas S.
Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 487,
492 (1994) (defining rational choice theory); Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for
Coping with Climate Change 5, 10 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095,
2009) (describing rational choice theory as the basis for collective action theory, which
predicts that no one will reduce energy consumption without third-party rule
enforcement).
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in responding to climate change.31 In those cities that manifest a polit-
ical desire to respond to climate change more aggressively than their
surrounding jurisdictions, public control or ownership of energy may
be a particularly effective tool in accomplishing these objectives. Con-
versely, many localities with different political predilections will never
outperform their states on climate change, irrespective of public con-
trol over their electric utility, creating a need for multi-scalar
responses.
This Article’s primary contribution is to provide the first theoret-
ical examination of public utility ownership as a climate change
strategy. In finding ample theoretical support for cities’ movements in
this direction, it provides reasons for scholars and lawmakers alike to
pay more attention to strategies that enhance local ownership and
control. In its examination, this Article confines itself specifically to
city-centered efforts, neglecting two other “public” forms of utility
ownership in the United States: rural electric cooperatives (co-ops)
and public power, or public utility, districts (PUDs).32 I focus on cities
because they have taken a decided lead on linking the issues of cli-
31 CCA and municipalization often have the advantage of being a one-way ratchet:
Because states typically subject municipalized cities and CCAs to environmental
obligations, cities usually cannot underperform their resident states. See, e.g., Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab., Renewable Portfolio Standards, NREL, http://www.nrel.gov/
tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standards.html (last updated
July 6, 2015) (noting that states can choose whether to apply renewable energy targets to
municipal utilities and recommending they do so as a best practice).
32 These ownership structures are similar to municipalization: In them, a community
jointly owns and manages its electricity grid, and sometimes also owns—either on its own,
or in collaboration with other communities—some generation resources. See
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 13
(2011) [hereinafter RAP]. The primary feature distinguishing co-ops and PUDs from
municipally owned utilities is geographic: These alternative forms exist predominantly in
rural or partially rural areas. See Comment, Power Districts: An Emerging Device for Low
Cost Electricity, 60 YALE L.J. 483, 485–86 (1951) (explaining that municipal corporations
typically serve cities while rural areas were traditionally not served by private or municipal
corporations); see also Donald G. Balmer, From Symbiosis to Synergy: A Case Study of
Public and Private Electric Power in the Pacific Northwest, 13 ENVTL. L. 637, 640–41
(1983). As such, these entities serve a much larger geographic area than municipal utilities,
but a slightly smaller customer base: As of 2013, cooperatives and public utility districts
served about 27% of the population, while owning distribution lines covering three
quarters of the nation’s landmass. Maps, COOPERATIVE.COM, https://www.cooperative
.com/public/maps/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); U.S. Electric Utility
Industry Statistics, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElec
tricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (drawing from Energy
Information Administration data). For a different reason, I also exclude federally owned
entities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Administration:
These major power generators do not sell directly to consumers. See, e.g., Roger D.
Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific
Northwest: A Primer on the Northwest Power Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 245, 247 (1983)
(“BPA does not sell power directly to consumers.”); TVA at a Glance, TENN. VALLEY
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mate change and local control. However, co-ops and PUDs might
hold the same structural promise as municipal ownership as a way to
respond to climate change.33 Indeed, there are early signs that many
PUDs and co-ops—whether for political or forward-looking economic
reasons—increasingly have similar desires to decarbonize more rap-
idly than the grid as a whole.34 Where this is the case, I would antici-
pate that my arguments regarding the benefits of public ownership in
responding to shifting goals would hold.35
That said, public ownership—and full municipal ownership in
particular—is unlikely to sweep the nation, given the complexities
involved and the legal constraints that exist in many states. But state
courts, legislatures, and regulators have important roles to play in
facilitating local efforts to reclaim control over energy supplies. This
AUTHORITY, https://www.tva.gov/About-TVA/TVA-at-a-Glance (last visited Nov. 14,
2016) (describing how TVA provides electricity to local power companies).
33 One potential reason for slower movement from cooperatives and PUDs on
addressing climate change is that their boundaries tend not to coincide with other political
boundaries, such as city boundaries, with which the populace more readily identifies. In
municipalized cities, the electric utility is either directly, or via a separate board, under the
control of the city council. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B (describing the structure of Austin’s
municipal utility). The council oversees energy governance not as an independent task, but
as part of its larger agenda of building a strong city. See id. The boards of cooperatives and
utility districts lack this broad mandate, which may create less citizen involvement and less
power to plan comprehensively for a low-carbon future. See id.
34 One promising example of a cooperative moving aggressively on climate change is
the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC), which took over from the private utility in
2002 and has established a goal of 50% renewable energy by 2023. See Herman K. Trabish,
IOU, Co-op or Muni? Experts Debate the Creation of Public Utilities, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 16,
2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/iou-co-op-or-muni-experts-debate-the-creation-of-
public-utilities/405511/. However, KIUC’s takeover reportedly depended heavily upon
“unequivocal cooperation” from the private incumbent, which makes its situation
anomalous. See id.(describing details of the KIUC takeover). Nevertheless, many other
cooperatives now appear to be following suit. See, e.g., Peter Maloney, Iowa Electric Co-op
Looks to Buy RECs to Go “100% Carbon-Free,” UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 29, 2016), http://
www.utilitydive.com/news/iowa-electric-co-op-looks-to-buy-recs-to-go-100-carbon-free/
418328/ (noting that more than 90% of U.S. rural electric cooperatives provide electricity
from renewable energy sources); Kristen Wright, Rural Electric Cooperatives Find
Renewable Energy Super Star in Solar, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (Feb. 17, 2015), http://
www.elp.com/articles/print/volume-93/issue-1/sections/renewables-sustainability/rural-
electric-cooperatives-find-renewable-energy-super-star-in-solar.html (“As of October,
member-owned, nonprofit co-ops had some 95 MW of owned and purchased solar
capacity, and they’re planning to add some 144 MW more by 2017 for a total of nearly 240
MW in 34 states, according to the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(NRECA).”).
35 See, e.g., Frank Jossi, In Midwest, Rural Co-ops Taking a Lead on Community Solar,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/11/11/in-
midwest-rural-co-ops-taking-a-lead-on-community-solar/ (documenting the popularity of
community solar in cooperatives in Kansas, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, and Minnesota,
and explaining that “[i]n nearly all cases, the co-ops say they’re responding to the demands
of their memberships”).
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Article concludes that these lawmakers should view such efforts not as
a repudiation of state authority, but as a set of useful, small-scale
experiments with alternative governance models that may prove more
capable of effectively mitigating climate change. These experiments
may, in turn, help spur innovation within more traditional forms of
public-private utility regulation.36
Beyond offering lessons for regulatory design within energy law,
this Article functions as a cautionary tale within the literature on con-
tracting out. Climate change has radically altered the demands we
place upon the electricity sector and our primary aims in regulating it.
These changes, in turn, have motivated many cities to reconsider the
century-old decision to relinquish control over electricity supply to
private companies overseen by state commissions. But reversal of
such entrenched institutions and regulatory schema proves politically
challenging. The story of cities’ struggles to reclaim control over
energy as a way to respond to climate change thus adds force to the
concerns of many outsourcing critics who question the long-term con-
sequences of contracting out.37 Two interrelated conclusions emerge:
First, we should not assume that government can reliably predict ex
ante whether a seemingly straightforward task may become political
in the years ahead,38 such that the calculus of outsourcing changes.
And second, if that calculus does change, we should not presume that
a task that has been outsourced can easily be reclaimed for direct gov-
ernmental control.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I sketches the contours of
modern contracting out theory before turning to describe the century-
old decision to “contract out” electricity’s provision to private entities,
managed under a complex regulatory framework. Part II describes the
36 Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (arguing for greater use of
“democratic experimentalism,” in which localities experiment in government service
provision and central regulators facilitate learning from one another’s experimentation).
37 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 241, 242 (expressing concern that
contractors, who are not held to the same public and legal accountability regimes as the
government, gain “significant discretion to set policy”); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2003)
[hereinafter Minow, Public and Private] (discussing certain risks of privatization, including
allowing actors to bypass regulations and standards that affect public programs).
38 “Political” in this context means worthy of democratic debate as to purposes. It
contrasts with matters of pure instrumental rationality, where goals are established and
only the means of implementation are in question. Cf. Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and
Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 910 (2010) [hereinafter Rubin,
Possibilities and Limitations] (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20)
(“Policy formation represents a choice of goals or values; implementation is a form of
instrumental rationality designed to achieve the defined goal in an effective manner.”).
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significant transition that climate change requires of the electricity
sector and outlines options for responding to these challenges. Part III
applies theories of contracting out to argue that municipal ownership
and CCA may prove superior forms of energy governance for the cli-
mate change era. Part IV utilizes a case study of Austin, Texas’s
municipal utility to examine how this theory translates into practice.
Part V discusses the possibilities and limitations that stem from
municipalization and CCA’s predominantly local character, and con-
siders the state role in these local affairs. The conclusion briefly flips
the Article’s framework, asking not what energy governance can learn
from contracting out theory, but what contracting out theory can learn
from energy governance.
I
CONTRACTING OUT: NOW AND THEN
Scholars typically treat electricity law as part of the specialized
field of public utility law, which manages the prices and practices of
certain private industries of major social importance.39 Rightly so,
given the industry’s current structure: Since the early 1900s, private
companies have provided the majority of electricity service in the
United States.40 For this reason, electricity provisioning has remained
outside the purview of the recent scholarly focus on the advisability of
contracting out governmental functions to private entities. But such
was not always the case: Electricity law had its own contracting out
debate long ago, when fierce public battles erupted over whether
cities or private companies should own and manage electricity
networks.
Of course, even if this long-ago debate had never existed, there
might still be good reasons for cities to now question whether public
ownership proves superior to the predominant status quo of regulated
private utilities in the climate change era. But it is instructive to
understand how our current model came to be, and how the provi-
sioning of electricity has long been viewed as a critical function worthy
39 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (tracing the origin of the concept within
U.S. law of private property, which became “clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence”); see also Boyd, supra note 22, at 1636–38
(“[Munn] is generally viewed as the progenitor of modern public utility law in the United
States.”).
40 RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCOTT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE HUNDRED-YEAR
WAR OVER ELECTRICITY 43–47 (1986) (describing the rise and domination of several large
private electricity companies in the early 1900s); see also DAVID SCHAP, MUNICIPAL
OWNERSHIP IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A CENTENNIAL VIEW 9 (1986)
(documenting the decrease of municipal power operations in the early 1900s).
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of substantial debate as to the appropriate mechanisms of govern-
mental control.
For these reasons, as cities reconsider the propriety of contracting
out electricity supply in the era of climate change, it is time to connect
the century-old debate over privatizing electricity with the modern
literature that has developed to analyze and clarify contracting out
decisions. This section provides the background necessary to do so by
giving an overview of three topics: the modern literature on con-
tracting out; the history of the decision to contract out electricity in
the early 1900s; and the dominant model of contract management that
now exists within electricity, public utility law.
A. Contemporary Contracting Out Theory
In their 2009 edited volume Government by Contract, Jody
Freeman and Martha Minow open with the observation that “we live
in an era of pervasive government outsourcing,” and go on to trace
how the U.S. government has outsourced a sizeable portion of its
work to private contractors over the last several decades.41 Particu-
larly during the 1990s, politicians across the political spectrum
embraced contracting out, downsizing, reinvention, privatization, and
deregulation as cures for the ills of modern bureaucracy.42 Concur-
rently, scholars within administrative law and public policy developed
a robust literature addressing when government should provide a ser-
vice itself, or alternatively contract out the provision to a private
entity.43
41 See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 1, 1. Others commentators also note the
prevalence of privatization and contracting in modern governments. See, e.g., Megginson
& Netter, supra note 28, at 321 (“[P]rivatization now appears to be accepted as a
legitimate—often a core—tool of statecraft by governments of more than 100 countries.”);
Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84
N.C. L. REV. 397, 399 (2006) (underlining the rapid growth in the “number of private
contractors doing the work of government”). However, some scholars trace a longer, less
linear pathway to “contracted out” government. See, e.g., Salamon, supra note 20, at 1, 7–8
(suggesting that government has long been structured in ways that advocates of
“reinventing government” toward privatization envisioned in the 1990s).
42 See Salamon, supra note 20, at 8 (acknowledging “third-party government” and
those who “[a] half century ago . . . called attention to the rapid innovation in techniques of
social intervention”); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (describing regulation as being widely
“under attack . . . as inefficient, ineffective, and undemocratic”).
43 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, supra  note 20 (collecting scholarship analyzing contracting out’s
ramifications); Verkuil, supra note 41, at 418 (describing “[t]he new lexicon of government
management” including “‘privatization,’ ‘public and private partnerships,’ ‘deregulation,’
‘downsizing,’ and ‘self-regulation,’” and discussing some of the ramifications of this new
lexicon).
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I offer the following overview of the contracting out framework
and related public law concerns to organize thinking around the ques-
tion of whether we are ready to embrace city takeovers of electric
utilities as a way to respond to climate change. If we are, then it must
be because outsourcing offers limited advantages, or obvious disad-
vantages, in the context of managing utilities under climate change. If
we are not, then scholars, policy makers, and world leaders would be
wise to reconsider the celebration of city power that dominates cur-
rent thinking around how to achieve necessary reductions in carbon
pollution.
In either event, the theoretical literature on when to contract out
provides a useful analytical frame for this inquiry. One of the leading
scholars on this topic, political scientist John Donahue, suggests that
“[t]he best candidates for contractual outsourcing satisfy the three
straightforward criteria of specificity, ease of evaluation, and competi-
tion.”44 Specificity refers to the extent to which a particular function
can be specified in detail, in advance.45 Ease of evaluation, as it
sounds, turns on whether the service’s delivery can be evaluated early
and quickly, as outsourcing does not work well when outcomes are
“inherently ambiguous or opaque.”46 And finally, competition refers
to the degree of competition that the private entity awarded the con-
tract faces, as outsourcing offers the most efficiency benefits when
there is a robustly competitive market.47 Applying these criteria
allows for the separation of “commodity tasks,” which “involve dis-
crete, measurable functions” and are therefore appropriately con-
tracted out, from “custom tasks,” which are “complex, sophisticated
activities that are less suitable for outsourcing.”48
Other scholars of outsourcing have suggested similar delinea-
tions. Trevor Brown and Matthew Potoski, for example, find that the
critical factors influencing the government’s decision to internalize or
externalize production are “service-specific characteristics, the degree
of competition for producing the good or service, and goal incongru-
ence between the vendors and the contracting organization.”49 Simi-
44 Donahue, supra note 20, at 42.
45 See id. at 44.
46 See id. at 45.
47 See id.; see also Megginson & Netter, supra note 28, at 330 (suggesting that the
“justification for privatization” is weakened in the case of “public goods and natural
monopolies”).
48 Donahue, supra note 20, at 42.
49 See Trevor L. Brown & Matthew Potoski, Transaction Costs and Institutional
Explanations for Government Service Production Decisions, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 441, 443–44 (2003). In arriving at their model, Brown and Potoski draw explicitly
from transaction cost economics literature that theorized whether private firms should
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larly, outsourcing scholar Steven Kelman suggests that “core
competencies” should remain within government, as well as tasks that
involve uncertainty and asset specificity, where it is hard to develop a
contract that covers important demands or to measure where the con-
tracted-for quality has been delivered, and difficult to switch among
private competitors once a contract has been awarded.50
As the foregoing paragraphs suggest, scholars have reached a fair
degree of consensus around key characteristics that make a service
appropriate for contracting out. At the same time, public law scholars
have raised an additional set of concerns that go beyond these prac-
tical considerations. Some worry that contracting out certain functions
threatens to erode their symbolic, political significance and to replace
deliberative, democratic processes that build a public will with a mass
of consumers of services.51 Similarly, if contracting out is pursued on a
large scale through accumulated instances, it may erode government’s
capabilities and value in ways not made apparent during any partic-
ular contracting out decision.52 Both of these concerns point to the
“make” versus “buy” particular components of their business. See id. Other scholars
elaborate on the factors influencing this “make” or “buy” decision. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe,
The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 759 (1984) (“The contractual
paradigm suggests . . . that government is more likely to prefer the private contracting
method when contractor ‘types’ (reputations, expertise, honesty) are well known, service
outputs are easily measured, and negotiations are not plagued by the small-numbers
problem.”); John Vickers & George Yarrow, Economic Perspectives on Privatization, 5 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 111, 116 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of competition to
performance).
50 See Kelman, supra note 20, at 154–57 (drawing these factors from the transaction
cost economics work of Oliver Williamson); see also Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127 (1997) (developing a framework that generally favors private
contracting, but suggests reserving governmental control when there are many
opportunities for private contractors to erode quality, strong incentives for public
managers to control contracts, and limited competition after a contract has been awarded);
David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information, and Incentives, 6
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567, 568, 574–75 (1987) (asserting that government gains
from the lower “residual rights of intervention” under public ownership, which may be
important for contracts that are “very complex and subject to frequent change” and where
the government is unable to “specify completely its preferences”).
51 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance (discussing the problem of “blurring,” where state power is
delegated to private actors “without customary accountability arrangements for the use of
that power”), in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115,
135–36 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); see also Minow, Public and Private, supra note 37,
at 1235 (describing concern about private actors using public funds to make critical
decisions about traditionally public-controlled programs, which could lead, for example, to
fees or restrictions on such activities).
52 See Minow, Public and Private, supra note 37, at 1235–36 (noting that “[l]ocal, state,
and federal governments make numerous but discrete decisions[ ] to subcontract . . . [that]
are separated in time and space,” often making “patterns of social provision . . . difficult to
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conclusion that some “inherently governmental” functions should not
be contracted out, irrespective of whether their particular characteris-
tics fit the criteria developed by outsourcing scholars.53 These con-
cerns have been particularly acute in the contexts of privatized
prisons, the delegation of military-related functions to private contrac-
tors abroad, and the use of religious organizations to provide basic
social services domestically.54
Alongside these debates, the privatization and deregulatory
revolution also prompted a new wave of inquiry into the murky con-
cept of “accountability.” Some suggest that contracting out might
enhance accountability; others that it lessens it.55 Parsing this debate,
Jerry Mashaw thoughtfully argues that whether contracting out
increases or decreases accountability depends on a more precise
understanding of what kind of accountability one values.56 Direct gov-
ernmental service provision provides accountability via electoral
politics and bureaucratic regimes, thereby reinforcing democracy and
the rule of law; contracting out provides accountability through the
competition of the marketplace, which promotes efficiency above
discern”); Verkuil, supra note 41, at 419 (“One can . . . applaud the efficiency-based
achievements [of privatization] while questioning its long term consequences.”).
53 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003)
(addressing the constitutional implications of contracting out); see also Verkuil, supra note
41, at 439 (noting that “inherently governmental functions, which were once thought to be
overarticulated, are now increasingly at risk” of being outsourced). But see Freeman &
Minow, supra note 41, at 13 (observing the “instability of the ‘inherently governmental’
designation”).
54 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons (analyzing
privatization in the prison context), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 128;
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy (focusing on the use of private contractors
in the U.S. military), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 110; Minow, Public
and Private, supra note 37, at 1233 (discussing the policy priority of President George W.
Bush to allow religious institutions to provide welfare and social services).
55 See John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public
Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 26, 38 (describing how, when done right,
contracting out can improve public accountability); cf. Kelman, supra note 20, at 189
(suggesting the best fix for accountability challenges raised by contracting out is to solve
the “human capital crisis” in government, to better manage contracts); Mashaw, supra note
51, at 134–35 (suggesting that contracting out is “conceptually destabilizing” for notions of
accountability); Mendelson, supra note 35 (suggesting ways to increase contractor
accountability); Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government
(arguing that “[t]he major challenge posed by third-party government stems from the
diffuse political authority embedded in third-party relationships”), in THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 20, at 525.
56 See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 116–17 (describing the “accountability regimes”); see
also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2113–19 (2005) [hereinafter Rubin, The Myth] (critiquing the use of
“accountability” as a justification for devolution of authority to private parties).
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other values.57 Neither of these accountability regimes is without
faults, so which to choose in a particular context depends on what
normative values we want an accountability regime to promote.58
All of these concerns—about particular service characteristics,
additional public values, and appropriate methods of accountability—
are implicated in the emerging debate over how best to govern utili-
ties today, and the role public ownership might play in combating cli-
mate change. Part III of this Article applies the scholarship outlined
here to reach conclusions on this point. First, however, it is necessary
to explain how the United States reached the point where electricity
became largely contracted out, and how public utility law attempts to
manage the relationship between privately owned electric utilities and
their government overseers.
B. Contracting Out Electricity: Municipalization’s Rise and Fall
A century before the modern debate over the threats posed by
large-scale contracting out of government services, the country was
already attuned to the dangers of allowing private companies to
deliver electricity. In 1905, Edward Dunne won the mayoralty of Chi-
cago on a platform of “Immediate Municipal Ownership.”59 In New
York City, the Tammany Hall political machine barely kept the
Municipal Ownership League out of office.60 Mayors in several other
major American cities clinched victory by running on municipalization
platforms.61 And in the academy, prominent legal, economics, and
political science scholars fought over municipalization’s merits.62
57 Mashaw, supra note 51, at 120–24; see also JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION
DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 10 (1989) [hereinafter DONAHUE, DECISION]
(“[E]fficiency, at base, is merely one aspect of a more fundamental quality—
accountability.”).
58 Mashaw, supra note 51, at 129.
59 DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE
AGE 148 (1998).
60 See Joseph Patrick Sullivan, From Municipal Ownership to Regulation: Municipal
Utility Reform in New York City, 1880-1907, at 444–50 (May 1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Rutgers University–New Brunswick) (on file with the New York University
Law Review) (explaining the shift of union political allegiance during the early 1900s).
61 See DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA 176 (1990) (connecting the election of
socialist mayors to the prominence of municipalization); RODGERS, supra note 59, at
135–36, 148–49 (describing municipalization mayoral campaigns in New York, Detroit,
Chicago, San Francisco, and Cleveland).
62 See, e.g., William P. Belden, Governor Pingree and His Reforms, 34 AM. L. REV. 36,
44–50 (1900) (criticizing past Michigan governor’s attempts to bring municipal ownership
to Detroit); Carman F. Randolph, Municipal Ownership of Public Utilities (pts. 1 & 2), 22
YALE L.J. 355, 461 (1913) (assessing the legal aspects of municipal ownership); see also
David Nord, The Experts Versus the Experts: Conflicting Philosophies of Municipal Utility
Regulation in the Progressive Era, 58 WIS. MAG. HIST. 219, 221 (1975) (“Academic experts
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Municipalization’s appeal came from the increasingly obvious
failures of private electricity supply. As electricity became available in
the 1880s, multiple private utility companies sprang up to supply elec-
tricity within most U.S. cities.63 To obtain exclusive municipal
franchises, these companies negotiated with—and frequently bribed—
city council members.64 With such franchises in place, utilities had
little incentive to maintain quality of service.65
Municipal ownership, in contrast, eliminated the drive to make a
profit and allowed for a broader agenda around electrification.66 Con-
sequently, its supporters hoped it would lower electricity rates and
raise living standards,67 end bribery of city officials,68 and increase
in law and economics . . . played leading roles in developing municipal utility regulation—
perhaps the number one issue of municipal reform in the progressive era.”).
63 See, e.g., William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the
Origins of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050,
1054 (2002) (“In the Manhattan borough of New York alone, for example, 25 nonexclusive
franchises were granted between 1882 and 1900.”).
64 See, e.g., Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A
Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247, 258 (1981) (describing
how franchise grabs agreed to by city councilmen came under increasing attack during the
Progressive Era); Edward F. Dunne, Our Fight for Municipal Ownership, THE
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 18, 1906, at 927, 930 (observing how corruption had “marked the
history of private management of public utilities in Chicago and elsewhere in America”).
Sullivan describes how exclusive franchises allowed utilities and political machines to work
in tandem in a new “corrupt alliance.” Sullivan, supra note 60, at 17; see also RICHARD
HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12–14 (1999) (recounting how corrupt Chicago
politicians actively sought cash payments and other favors from private electric
companies). Typically, cities had the right within their charter to grant franchises to utility
companies, although in some places the right lay with the state. Nord, supra note 62, at 223.
65 See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 298 (noting that private utilities’ safety violations
pushed New Yorkers towards municipal ownership).
66 See, e.g., Walter L. Fisher, The American Municipality, in MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE
OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 33, 42, 184 (1907) (noting the fundamental fact of
municipal ownership that the “sole object is not a money profit”); Marshall E. Dimock,
British and American Utilities: A Comparison, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 278 (1933)
(explaining that the elimination of profit motive should improve service quality).
67 See RODGERS, supra note 59, at 142 (linking municipalization movements to hopes
that American cities would begin to more closely resemble European cities, which were
cleaner and less corrupt).
68 See, e.g., John R. Commons, Municipal Electric Lighting, in MUNICIPAL
MONOPOLIES 55, 174 (Edward W. Bemis ed., New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.
Publishers 1899) (“[N]ine-tenths of the existing municipal corruption and inefficiency
result from the policy of leaving municipal functions to private parties . . . .”); George
Stewart Brown, Municipal Ownership of Public Utilities, N. AM. REV. 701, 701 (1906)
(“[M]unicipal ownership is a political necessity [that] will remove the main and most
threatening source of political corruption.”); Randolph, supra note 62, at 359 (explaining
how the perception that private ownership of public utilities is inherently corrupt led to
support of municipal ownership).
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public participation in local government.69 In these ways, the move-
ment for municipalization was connected with the “home rule” move-
ment, which sought to make cities “active agents of reform” by
devolving authority over a wide range of decisions to the local level.70
Around the turn of the twentieth century, thousands of cities and
towns tried municipal ownership,71 particularly in those states that
clearly permitted it.72 By 1907, municipal power companies made up
30% of U.S. electricity suppliers,73 and it looked likely that municipal-
ization would emerge as the preferred utility ownership model.74
However, beginning that same year, utilities threw their weight behind
state regulatory commissions, a model that was considerably more
appealing to them than city takeovers of their private businesses.75
The public looked favorably on state commissions as a different solu-
tion to the problem of local utility-government corruption.76 In 1907,
New York and Wisconsin passed legislation giving utility regulatory
commissions strong powers to oversee the rates and practices of the
69 See, e.g., J. Allen Smith, Effect of State Regulation of Public Utilities upon Municipal
Home Rule, 54 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 87–88 (1914) (making a case
against state regulation, as opposed to local regulation, on the grounds that there was no
adequate guarantee that power would be exercised “in the interest of the local public for
whose protection it is designed”).
70 See Barron, supra note 18, at 2280 (describing how participants in the late
nineteenth-century home rule movement understood the term).
71 From 1897 to 1907, towns and cities voted to establish between 60 and 120 new
municipal electric utilities each year, causing municipally owned electric utilities to grow at
twice the rate of private companies. NYE, supra note 61, at 179. Of course, many of the
places establishing municipal utilities during this time frame were small towns that no
private utility had an interest in serving, making public ownership more a matter of
necessity than Progressivism in these places. Id.
72 Municipalization was not a natural right of cities; it required state authorizing
legislation. See Randolph, supra note 62, at 473–74 (describing how cities can only
municipalize with new authorizing legislation). Some states had broad, general statutes
permitting cities to municipalize services of their choice. See id. at 467–68 (describing how
most municipal utilities are chartered under general laws). In others, cities often faced
confusion as to whether municipalization of particular services was permitted, impeding
municipalization efforts. See id. at 363 (discussing this issue); see also DAVID SCHAP,
MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 27 (1986) (“As late as 1912,
it was still unclear whether even one-half of the cities in the United States had the legal
authority to own public utilities.”).
73 HIRSH, supra note 64, at 15.
74 See Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for State Utility Regulatory
Commissions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 249 (1958) (explaining the popularity of the
municipal model in the early 1900s and its subsequent exponential growth).
75 Id. at 250; David J. Hess, Electricity Transformed: Neoliberalism and Local Energy in
the United States, 43 ANTIPODE 1056, 1064 (2011).
76 McDonald, supra note 74, at 244; Nord, supra note 62, at 227–28.
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states’ private utilities.77 Other states quickly followed suit: By 1914,
two-thirds of states had commissions.78
The creation of state commissions did not foreclose the possibility
of municipalization: State statutes adopting commissions typically
explicitly permitted municipalization as a check on private utility per-
formance.79 But as a practical matter, the existence of commissions
dampened the drive for municipalization. Although many considered
state regulation an inadequate substitute,80 it appeased most former
supporters as a reasonable solution to city-level corruption challenges,
causing the municipalization movement to lose momentum.81
By 1923, the number of municipally owned utilities had peaked.82
Private systems had distinct advantages when it came to economies of
scale, given that municipal utilities were limited to serving local cus-
tomers within municipal boundaries.83 To enlarge their service territo-
ries and achieve the savings associated with larger-scale generation
and transmission systems, private utilities purchased and consolidated
the more profitable municipal systems, building major transmission
lines to connect their growing holdings.84 In the following decades,
surviving municipal utilities transitioned to purchasing the majority of
their power from these more affordable outside sources, rather than
generating their own electricity.85
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, only spotty
and typically unsuccessful attempts at municipalization occurred.
Although the legal right to municipalize remains in almost every
77 See Delos F. Wilcox, Effects of State Regulation upon the Municipal Ownership
Movement, 53 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 71 (1914); see also HIRSH, supra
note 64, at 20–23 (describing the New York and Wisconsin laws as strong ones, which gave
their commissions broad jurisdiction).
78 Wilcox, supra note 77, at 71.
79 Or, some states adopted “home rule” statutes that reserve for municipalities all
powers not explicitly exercised by the state government, in which case municipalization is
presumptively allowed. See ABBY BRIGGERMAN, RADU COSTINESCU & ASHLEY BOND,
AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, SURVEY OF STATE MUNICIPALIZATION LAWS (2012) (examining
each state’s municipalization policy).
80 See Barron, supra note 18, at 2317 (describing home rulers’ emphasis on local
democracy as a central component of cities’ welfare).
81 See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 451; see also Wilcox, supra note 77, at 72 (noting the
three types of support for state regulation).
82 See SCHAP, supra note 72, at 9–11, 35, 53.
83 See RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 40, at 43 (describing the financial clout of
private holding companies).
84 See id. at 42–48 (chronicling the rise of private utility companies and their business
growth strategies).
85 See SCHAP, supra note 72, at 97 (showing that 1151 out of 2033 municipal electric
systems purchased all of their power in 1950).
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state,86 localities only really mobilized to municipalize electric services
in notable numbers during the period following electricity price spikes
in the 1970s and 1980s.87 Between 1947 and 1996, 125 new electric
municipal systems formed.88 At the same time, however, the advent of
“power pooling”—the linking up of transmission lines between
regions—encouraged further utility acquisitions of municipal systems,
as utilities exploited ever-greater economies of scale.89 For this reason,
even though municipalization efforts rose during the 1970s and into
the 80s, the overall number of municipal utilities remained stable.90
A second, smaller wave of municipalization occurred around a
decade later, following 1992 changes in federal law that required utili-
ties to allow power purchased by other entities to cross their transmis-
sion lines.91 These changes made it easier for cities to purchase cheap
wholesale electricity from outside sources, increasing the appeal of
municipalization.92 Between 1993 and 1997, many cities seriously con-
sidered municipalization, although only a handful completed the pro-
cess.93 The obstacles to municipalizing—including utility opposition
and the legal requirement that cities help fund previously incurred
utility infrastructure costs and contractual obligations that benefitted
their residents—proved too substantial for most localities.94
86 See BRIGGERMAN, COSTINESCU & BOND, supra note 79, at 6, 22 (finding statutory
right to municipalize in every state except Hawaii, which is silent on the matter, and Rhode
Island, which requires specific legislative authority).
87 These price spikes were caused largely by increases in the price of oil and significant
cost overruns in building nuclear reactors. See RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 83, at
196–97 (describing the problem and noting that electricity prices went up in the Northeast
by 50% due to oil price increases in 1973).
88 Michael J. Doane & Daniel E. Spulber, Muncipalization: Opportunism and Bypass in
Electric Power, 18 ENERGY L.J. 333, 351 (1997).
89 RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 83, at 119.
90 SCHAP, supra note 72, at 94.
91 Energy Policy Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k (2012); Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 18
C.F.R. §§ 35, 385 (1996) (requiring utilities to provide transmission services at rates and at
terms and conditions comparable to rates provided by the utility itself); see also James R.
Pierobon, Welcome, Public Power, to Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1994, at 19,
19 (“The ‘walls’ that have traditionally divided investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and public
power agencies are beginning to fall.”).
92 Kelly, supra note 9, at 49 (providing examples of cities purchasing power from power
brokers); see also Saxer, Government Power Unleashed, supra note 25, at 70 (detailing two
municipalization efforts in Oregon that were precipitated by the Enron scandal and sought
to lower rates and provide reliable service).
93 Kelly, supra note 9, at 43. Writing in 1997, Kelly found that two cities had completed
municipalization, six had rejected it, and the remainder were still considering it. Id.
94 In several cases, cities considered “muni lite,” or what some disparagingly called
“sham municipalization,” wherein the city would purchase just enough of its distribution
grid to be considered a public utility. City of Palm Springs, 76 FERC 61,127, 61,699 (1996)
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES IN THE U.S.

























In 1950, there were 2033 municipal electric systems in the United
States.96 That overall number has remained remarkably stable ever
since.97 Today, 2028 municipally owned systems serve around 14.4%
of U.S. residential electricity customers.98 Small towns own the vast
majority of such systems, but Seattle, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Austin,
San Antonio, and two dozen other cities with populations over
100,000 also have municipalized systems.99 These numbers show that
although public power has a solid foothold in the electricity industry,
(describing the attempts of the City of Palm Springs to engage in this practice). This option
was particularly appealing in areas where the private utility had pre-existing high-cost
contracts that the municipality wanted to avoid by purchasing power in the newly opened
wholesale market. Id. at 61,702–03 (denying an attempt by Palm Springs to engage in
“muni lite”); Kelly, supra note 9, at 53 (discussing implications of the City of Palm Springs
FERC decision); see also Doane & Spulber, supra note 88, at 338 (describing various
means through which municipalities attempt to evade competition transitions charges for
stranded costs, including engaging in “muni lite”).
95 SCHAP, supra note 72, at 35, 53, 97; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 2001, at 2 (2003), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482001.pdf;
Public Power Statistics, APPA: AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, http://www.publicpower.org/
About/interiorsidebar.cfm?ItemNumber=38733&navItemNumber=38732 (last visited Nov.
5, 2016).
96 SCHAP, supra note 72, at 97.
97 Id. at 87.
98 See AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, PUBLIC POWER: SHINING A LIGHT ON PUBLIC SERVICE
2 (2014), http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/PPFactSheet.pdf (noting that 1400
systems are in towns of fewer than 10,000 residents).
99 See Diane Moody, Paul Zummo & Mark Beauchamp, Public Power by the Numbers,
ELECTRICITY J., July 2013, at 85, 87; Delia Patterson, Public Power: Relevant Then,
Relevant Now, ELECTRICITY J., July 2013, at 91, 91. Many states allow the formation of
Joint Action Agencies, which agglomerate municipalities into larger agencies to achieve
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it lost its democratic momentum during the latter half of the twentieth
century.
C. State Regulation’s Long and Evolving Reign
In contrast, the state commission model that states flocked to
during the early 1900s has proven to be an enduring regulatory design.
Today, all fifty states have public utilities commissions (PUCs),100
each of which closely oversees the state’s investor-owned utilities.101
Since the 1930s, as electricity companies expanded beyond state
boundaries, state PUCs have shared jurisdiction over electricity with
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),102 which over-
sees interstate “wholesale” energy sales—that is, sales of electricity
between utilities—and interstate transmission.103 Under this model,
commissions establish the rates that private utility companies are
allowed to charge consumers, with a mandate that the rates be “just
and reasonable.”104 In exchange, utilities receive a monopoly service
territory that protects them from competition and are allowed to
recoup all “prudent” infrastructure investments, plus a commission-
determined rate of return, from their ratepayers.105
Scholars have long raised concerns regarding the challenges of
“harnessing”106 private enterprise under the commission model.107 As
economies of scale and make public ownership of generation more feasible. See Moody,
Zummo & Beauchamp, supra, at 86.
100 These are also referred to in various states as Public Service Commissions or
Corporation Commissions. Every state in the country, with the exception of Delaware,
enacted legislation establishing such a commission between 1907 and 1930. See Boyd &
Carlson, supra note 22, at 823. Delaware followed suit in 1949. See About the Public Service
Commission, DEL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, http://depsc.delaware.gov/about.shtml (last visited
Nov. 5, 2016); see also Regulatory Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMM’NS, http://
www.naruc.org/about-naruc/regulatory-commissions/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (containing
links to key information about the regulatory commission of each state).
101 See RAP, supra note 32, at 20 (2011) (providing an overview of the role of the
regulatory commission). In most states, statutes exempt public power (including
cooperatives and municipalized utilities) from commission oversight. Id. at 23.
102 See Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.) (creating the Federal Power Commission). The Federal Power
Commission became the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission after the passage of the
Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977. Department of Energy Organization
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 204, 401–07, 91 Stat. 565, 571, 582–87 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
103 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
104 RAP, supra note 32, at 31.
105 See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 118–19
(1993) (describing regulation as requiring a “break-even constraint” that gives firms
adequate financial incentives to keep supplying the good or service desired).
106 Boyd, supra note 22, at 1619.
107 See, e.g., Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 11 (1940) (noting that both regulators and courts favored utilities
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early as 1914, one scholar reported that “a great many are coming to
fear that the commissions . . . are primarily organs of the public utility
interests to protect themselves from the mosquito-bites of rampant
democracy”—i.e., municipalization efforts.108 Utilities, as private com-
panies beholden to their shareholders, naturally want to earn as much
profit as possible. Regulators want to keep prices charged to con-
sumers low, while also guaranteeing that the utilities are financially
healthy enough to provide a reliable supply of power into the
future.109 Within this relationship, the utility has incentives to con-
vince the regulator to overbuild infrastructure (upon which it earns a
rate of return).110 And the utility typically has informational and
expertise advantages in working with a commission to establish its
costs and the system’s infrastructure needs.111 These asymmetries
cause even the most scrupulous regulators to work at a disadvantage
compared to the utilities they regulate. Further complicating the pic-
ture, scholars have frequently accused commissions of being suscep-
tible to capture by the utilities they are charged with regulating.112
In response to these concerns, and in keeping with the out-
sourcing and deregulatory movement described in Part I, scholars and
during the 1930s); Comment, supra note 32, at 484–85 (calling regulation a “weak
substitute” for more public forms of utility governance).
108 Wilcox, supra note 77, at 75; see also WILLIAM E. MOSHER ET AL., ELECTRICAL
UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC CONTROL 1 (1929) (noting that opponents of the
commission model were motivated by this concern); Gray, supra note 107, at 15 (asserting
commissions had become “a device to protect the property, i.e., the capitalized expectancy,
of these monopolists from the just demands of society”).
109 See RAP, supra note 32, at 36 (explaining the types of costs that the regulator will
allow the utility to recover).
110 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1059 (1962) (observing that a firm has an incentive to
acquire additional capital if the allowable rate of return exceeds the cost of capital); see
also Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly (describing the theory and
importance of the Averch-Johnson model) [hereinafter Joskow, Natural Monopoly], in
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1227, 1298–1300 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
111 See Joskow, Natural Monopoly, supra note 110, at 1300 (describing the Averch-
Johnson model, but contending that it relies upon “extreme” assumptions about the level
of information asymmetries).
112 See, e.g., Gray, supra note 107, at 15 (noting that public policy is often driven by
private interests); Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and Deregulation
(observing that there have been studies taking both sides on whether utility regulation is
affected by industry capture, and noting that rent seeking can occur among competitive
firms as well), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419, 421–22
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (arguing that, generally,
industry seeks regulation and benefits from it); see also James E. Anderson, The Public
Utility Commission of Texas: A Case of Capture or Rapture?, 1 POL’Y STUD. REV. 484,
488–89 (1982) (charting how the Texas PUC became “enraptured” with the industry it
regulated).
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regulators have encouraged greater reliance on market forces, in place
of regulatory oversight, over the past several decades.113 This shift in
strategy has wrought major but patchy movement towards what some
call “deregulation,” and others “restructuring,” within the electricity
industry.114 Many states have required transmission and distribution
utilities to divest their electric generation assets.115 These generators
now submit bids for the price at which they will sell their electricity
into FERC-overseen regional wholesale electricity markets, or sell
their generation via forward contracts with utilities.116 Market partici-
pation, however, is optional.117 Some utilities, particularly those con-
centrated in the southeast and west, have opted not to join regional
markets.118
To add a further layer to this complex jurisdictional picture, fif-
teen states and the District of Columbia have also deregulated the
retail market for electricity, by creating what is frequently referred to
as “retail choice.”119 In these states, customers are free to select their
electricity supplier from a range of competitors offering different rates
and packages, instead of automatically being served by a single utility
given a monopoly over their service territory.120
113 See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1663–72 (chronicling this transformation).
114 Electricity differs from many markets because it requires perfect, second-by-second
balancing of supply and demand, such that markets require significant oversight
institutions—hence, the terminological battle. See James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller,
Introduction to ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 1, 5–10 (James
M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005); see also Alvin K. Klevorick, The Oversight of
Restructured Electricity Markets (describing how regulatory oversight remains an
important characteristic of the restructured electricity industry), in ELECTRICITY
DEREGULATION, supra, at 297, 298.
115 See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20
Years of Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437, 441 (2015) (explaining the shift in
generation to a market-based model). “Independent Power Producers” produced just
under 35% of electricity in the United States in 2012, up from 1.6% in 1997. Id. at 441–42.
116 These markets are run by “Regional Transmission Organizations” (RTOs), or
“Independent System Operators” (ISOs), which are regional bodies that control
transmission planning and operations for participating utilities, and also administer
wholesale electricity markets. See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser,
Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of
Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 551–54 (2007) (providing an
overview of RTOs).
117 FERC has stopped short of mandating RTO membership, perhaps due to concerns
over jurisdictional limits. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(d) (2016) (describing RTO membership as
optional).
118 Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the
United States [hereinafter Joskow, Difficult Transition], in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION:
CHOICES AND CHALLENGES, supra note 114, at 31, 32.
119 Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.
120 In these states, regulated utilities are still in charge of distribution. In most states,
however, retail choice has resulted in limited movement away from the historical
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In sum, we are at an interesting and messy crossroads with
respect to electric utility regulation: Some states retain traditional
oversight of vertically integrated utilities, which continue to own
transmission, distribution, and generation resources.121 Some states
belong to regional markets that supply wholesale electricity to their
state-regulated utilities;122 and some states have deregulated genera-
tion and supply, retaining control only over distribution utilities.123 It
is unclear whether the United States has reached a point of stasis with
respect to these three models, or whether continued evolution
towards market-dominated models is likely.124 What is clear is that
cities’ desires to act on climate change are opening up long-closed
debates over how these models stack up next to the previously
marginalized option of municipal ownership.
II
ELECTRICITY GOVERNANCE UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE
To fully understand the debate over whether publicly or privately
owned electricity systems can best manage the transition necessitated
by climate change, one must first understand what decarbonization
demands of our electricity systems. This Part begins by describing that
challenge. It then discusses the divergent ways in which electricity
governance might rise to meet it: through regulatory reform via either
smarter markets or reinvigorated public utility law; or through greater
reliance on public control and ownership via municipal ownership and
community choice aggregation. With this foundation in place, the next
monopoly suppliers. See State Electric Retail Choice Programs Are Popular with
Commercial and Industrial Customers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 24, 2012), http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6250#tabs_RenewablesMaps-3 (describing how
some customers have switched to competitive suppliers).
121 Most states in the Southeast and many in the West fall into this traditional category.
See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, supra note 119 (mapping the status of states
with respect to electricity restructuring); see also Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 835–36
(noting that twenty states fall into this category).
122 “Twelve states, including most of the Midwest and mid-Atlantic states and
California, operate with a hybrid model that combines competitive wholesale electricity
markets with the traditional IOU franchise at the retail level.” Boyd & Carlson, supra note
22, at 838. For a map of states belonging to regional markets, see Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO) , FED. ENERGY REG.
COMMISSION (July 18, 2016), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp.
123 Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 837 (“Together with Washington, D.C., sixteen
states, largely in the Northeast and Texas, fall into this category.”). For more detail on our
tripartite U.S. electricity system, see id. at 835–39, and Hammond & Spence, supra note
22.
124 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 815–18 (arguing that continued divergence
might be normatively desirable for producing climate-related innovation).
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Part returns to the literature on contracting out to plumb that theory
for insights on the relative prospects for these governance options.
A. Climate Change and Electricity
The United States cannot adequately respond to climate change
without transforming our electricity system, which contributes nearly
one-third of U.S. carbon pollution—more than any other sector.125 In
2009, global leaders agreed to a goal of limiting planetary warming to
two degrees Celsius in order to avert the worst consequences of cli-
mate change.126 At the most recent climate change negotiations in
December 2015 in Paris, amid growing concern about intolerably
severe consequences at even two degrees of warming,127 countries
pledged to strive to limit aggregate emissions “to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels.”128
To meet the two-degree Celsius target would require almost com-
plete decarbonization of developed country economies by 2050.129
This, in turn, would likely require almost eliminating emissions from
electricity while electrifying two other polluting segments of our
economy: transportation and heating.130 To accomplish this aim, elec-
tricity generation would need to approximately double by 2050, while
carbon emissions from electricity would need to be reduced to 3 to
125 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Electricity Sector Emissions, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electrici
ty.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2016).
126 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, at 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30,
2010) (reproducing the Copenhagen Accord of December 18, 2009).
127 See, e.g., James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature,
PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 1, 2 (“[T]here are already clear indications of undesirable
impacts at the current level of warming and . . . 2°C warming would have major deleterious
consequences.”).
128 Paris Agreement Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 2.1(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (further agreeing to “pursu[e]
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”).
129 JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., INC., 1 U.S. 2050: PATHWAYS
TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (rev. ed. 2015), http://deepdecarbon
ization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Report
.pdf; see also Ottman Edenhofer et al., Summary for Policymakers (concluding that
reaching a maximum of two degrees of warming will require reductions of energy
emissions from the energy supply sector of “90% or more below 2010 levels between 2040
and 2070”), in WORKING GRP. III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE at 1, 18 (Ottmar Edenhofer et
al. eds., 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-
for-policy makers.pdf.
130 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 129, at xv, 25.
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10% of current levels.131 Although the United States seems unlikely
to agree to this level of decarbonization at the national level soon,
many states and cities are taking on the challenge: As one indication,
166 subnational jurisdictions, representing over 1.09 billion people,
have signed an “Under 2 MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]”
jointly committing to reduce their emissions 80 to 95% below 1990
levels by 2050.132 And 1060 mayors signed the less demanding U.S.
Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement,133 which committed cities to
striving to achieve the Kyoto Protocol’s aim of reducing emissions 7%
below 1990 levels,134 even though the United States failed to ratify the
treaty.
Electricity regulators have difficult decisions to make regarding
how best to decarbonize electricity to meet these targets.135 Market
forces alone are exceedingly unlikely to push electricity towards
cleaner sources in the time frame demanded, given that carbon pollu-
tion is a classic—and indeed, as Richard Lazarus terms it, “super-
wicked”—externality.136 Carbon pollution’s “super-wickedness”
stems from the fact that its costs are borne by the global population,
especially the future global population, while the benefits of uncon-
trolled emissions accrue more locally and immediately.137 Accord-
ingly, there is widespread agreement that some sort of legal regime
will be necessary to achieve rapid decarbonization—at which point,
131 Id. at xv.
132 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Subnational Global Climate
Leadership, UNDER 2 MOU, http://under2mou.org/the-mou/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2017)
(reporting that 167 jurisdictions from thirty-two countries and six continents have signed
the MOU). See also Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (showing that the U.S.
signed but did not ratify the protocol).
133 See List of Participating Mayors, U.S. CONF. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION CTR.,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
134 See The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, U.S. CONF. MAYORS CLIMATE
PROTECTION CTR. 1, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgree
ment.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
135 Cf. Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law & Climate
Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 51 (2014) (“[W]hile it is increasingly clear that
significant changes in the energy sector are necessary to curb climate change, it is less clear
that any major state or regional players know how to achieve those changes in ways that
are technologically, economically, and politically feasible.”).
136 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009) (arguing that climate
change belongs in the category of “super wicked” problems because “the longer it takes to
address the problem, the harder it will be to do so” and “those who are in the best position
to address the problem are not only those who caused it, but also those with the least
immediate incentive to act within that necessary shorter timeframe”).
137 See id. at 1160–61 (noting additionally the absence of a global regulator).
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the relevant questions become what technologies might be available
to achieve decarbonization, and what legal frameworks can best
induce their uptake. This Section focuses on technological options; the
next three discuss possible legal frameworks.
Significant emissions reductions will likely require a combination
of strategies. One important component—often dubbed the “low-
hanging fruit” of emissions reductions138—will be energy efficiency.
U.S. states have already taken significant steps to promote energy effi-
ciency, causing energy savings to increase around 17% per year from
2006 to 2011.139 Nevertheless, experts suggest that U.S. households
may still have untapped savings opportunities amounting to 16 to 20%
of current energy demand.140 Additional opportunities exist for more
“demand response” policies, which focus on cutting energy demand at
peak periods, thereby lessening the need for new electricity
infrastructure.141
But energy efficiency and demand response cannot function as
stand-alone policies, given the depth of emissions reductions neces-
sary. To significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, electricity pro-
duction will have to shift from predominantly fossil fuel based, to
renewable or non-carbon sources, each with its own benefits and
drawbacks.
Renewable energy options include “distributed” small-scale
renewable generation, like rooftop solar panels, large utility-scale
wind farms and solar arrays, and major hydropower projects. The
optimal response to climate change is likely to include a combination
of large- and small-scale sources, both of which are becoming much
more affordable.142 Renewable energy accounted for 69% of all
138 See, e.g., PETER SERIAN ET AL., MOVING BEYOND LOW HANGING FRUIT:
SUCCESSFUL ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM OUTREACH STRATEGIES FOR COMMERCIAL
FACILITIES 5-294 (2014), http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2014/data/papers/5-542.pdf
(arguing that the next generation of energy efficiency strategies will have to go beyond the
“low hanging fruit” approaches that have characterized the sector in the past).
139 See DAVID FRANKEL, STEFAN HECK & HUMAYUN TAI, MCKINSEY & CO., SIZING
THE POTENTIAL OF BEHAVIORAL ENERGY-EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES IN THE US
RESIDENTIAL MARKET 1 (2013).
140 See id. at 2 exhibit 2 (charting the savings opportunities by sector).
141 Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority over Demand
Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 69, 76 (2013) (citations omitted) (“According to one recent study, well over 100
gigawatts of economic [demand response capacity] is available nationwide. This enormous
amount is equivalent to the capacity of hundreds of new fossil fuel-fired plants.”).
142 See MARK BOLINGER & JOACHIM SEEL, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR 2015: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROJECT COST, PERFORMANCE,
AND PRICING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, at i (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/
lbnl-1006037_report.pdf (“Median installed PV project prices within a sizable sample have
steadily fallen by nearly 60% since the 2007-2009 period.”); see also GALEN BARBOSE &
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power capacity installed in the United States in 2015,143 and the U.S.
Energy Information Administration projects that renewable genera-
tion, particularly wind and solar, will continue to grow substantially in
the coming decades—between 50% and 121% by 2040 under current
policies alone.144 However, significant reliance on renewables also
presents technological challenges, as the variability of energy pro-
duced from the wind and sun creates difficulties in integrating these
sources into electricity markets and the grid while maintaining
reliability.145
Two other carbon-free options for producing electricity are
nuclear energy- and fossil fuel–powered generation combined with
“carbon capture and storage” (CCS), a technology added onto gener-
ation plants that captures carbon dioxide emissions and injects them
deep underground for long-term storage.146 The extent to which each
of these technologies might play a role in efforts to decarbonize elec-
tricity remains an open question. Particularly after the devastating
consequences of nuclear plant failings in Japan following a 2011 tsu-
nami,147 nuclear energy faces significant renewed concern over the
severity of the risks it poses in the low-probability event of an acci-
dent.148 However, these risks must be weighed against its counter-
vailing benefit as a predictable source of carbon-free electricity.149
Notably, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chose to include
NAÏM DARGHOUTH, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., TRACKING THE SUN IX: THE
INSTALLED PRICE OF RESIDENTIAL AND NON-RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/tracking_the_sun_ix_report_
0.pdf (noting that 2015 “continue[d] the steady downward trend in PV system pricing,
though the pace of decline [was] somewhat slower than in recent years”).
143 Zachary Shahan, Renewables = 69% of New US Electricity Capacity in 2015, CLEAN
TECHNICA (Feb. 15, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/15/renewables-69-of-new-us-
electricity-capacity-in-2015/.
144 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, at 25 (2015), http://
www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf.
145 See David B. Spence, Regulation, Climate Change, and the Electric Grid, 3 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 267, 270 (2012) (cataloguing the challenges “associated
with integrating intermittent, renewable sources of electric generation into the grid”).
146 See generally Victor K. Der, Carbon Capture and Storage: An Option for Helping to
Meet Growing Global Energy Demand While Countering Climate Change, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 937, 951 (2010) (discussing the technology, its potential, and challenges for reducing
carbon dioxide emissions).
147 See generally Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and
Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1937 (discussing the potential implications of the
Fukushima nuclear disaster for U.S. energy law); Evan Osnos, The Fallout, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/17/the-fallout (discussing the
reaction to Fukushima in Japan).
148 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 178–84 (discussing the added cost of
nuclear energy stemming from perceptions of its risk).
149 See id. at 173–74 (comparing nuclear power favorably to coal-fired power in terms of
externalities).
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new nuclear energy as one method for states to utilize in complying
with the Clean Power Plan,150 and a few states are proceeding to build
new nuclear reactors.151
CCS is just beginning to reach commercial-scale deployment,152
and some experts question whether it is ever likely to play a signifi-
cant role in reducing U.S. emissions, given its costs.153 Currently, the
Department of Energy is providing incentives for several demonstra-
tion CCS plants,154 but these have faced frustrating cost overruns
during construction.155 Nevertheless, the latest findings by leading
experts suggest that it will be difficult to reach sustainable levels of
emissions globally without the use of this technology, as it remains
“the sole practical option to achieve considerable CO2 emission reduc-
tions from fossil-fueled power plants.”156
As this brief overview suggests, policy makers and regulators face
a complicated set of questions regarding how to move forward on
decarbonization. Some of the most promising technologies remain
experimental and in need of regulatory support, and no technology is
without drawbacks. To further complicate the picture, these decisions
must be made under the knowledge that climate change will create
differing future conditions, including amplified risk of disasters and
droughts, which will affect the relative desirability of future energy
150 The Clean Power Plan, if it proceeds would allow states to use new and expanded
nuclear operations to meet their emission reduction obligations. See Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80
Fed. Reg. 64,662, 65,757 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (noting the
importance of completing under-construction units to achieving emissions reductions).
However, the plan is currently stayed and President Trump has issued an executive order
urging its reconsideration. See Exec. Order No. 13783, Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017).
151 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 847–50 (describing new nuclear construction
in Georgia and South Carolina).
152 See Der, supra note 147, at 941.
153 See David Biello, The Carbon Capture Fallacy, SCI. AM., Jan. 2016, at 58, 61 (arguing
that expense has been a barrier to significant CCS development).
154 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NETL ADVANCED CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE R&D
PROGRAM: TECHNOLOGY UPDATE 12–13 (2013), https://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Libra
ry/Research/Coal/carbon%20capture/handbook/CO2-Capture-Tech-Update-2013-Chap
ters.pdf (listing eight demonstration projects for CCS technologies in the United States).
155 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 852 (describing the Kemper Plant in
Mississippi, originally projected to cost $2.2 billion but now likely to cost at least $6.49
billion).
156 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 155, at 4; see also Edenhofer et al., supra note
129, at 18 fig.SPM.7 (noting that “many models cannot reach [2 degrees Celsius] in the
absence of CCS”); Biello, supra note 154, at 60 (“There is no credible plan to stave off
global warming, whether from individual countries or the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, that does not include [CCS].”).
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infrastructure options.157 All told, given the scale of the change neces-
sary, the choices made about what energy sources to pursue, and how
quickly to pursue these changes, will have significant implications for
the shape and scale of American life in the coming generations.
B. Regulatory Solutions
It is tempting to assume, as almost all energy law scholars have,
that what is needed to tackle the decarbonization challenge described
above is better regulation.158 This view places faith in our ability to
redesign energy governance to confront the challenge of climate
change, without resort to public ownership.
There are two predominant proposed avenues for reforming elec-
tricity regulatory structures to better respond to climate change. One
is to continue or increase our reliance on markets to deliver energy,
but redesign market rules to accomplish climate change goals.159 Most
economists’ preferred way to accomplish this goal would be through
an economy-wide carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, which would
raise the cost of producing more carbon-intensive electricity, without
prejudging what technologies will best achieve decarbonization.160
There are certainly efficiency reasons to prefer such a solution; how-
ever, there are also many compelling arguments as to why a carbon
tax, standing alone, is unlikely as a practical matter to produce the
decarbonized future we desire.161 A full exploration of these objec-
157 Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, Adaptive Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector, 2011
BYU L. REV. 2115, 2121 (2011) (arguing that, in addition to mitigation, energy
infrastructure decisionmaking should further climate change adaptation aims).
158 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (outlining various
regulatory solutions to climate change).
159 See sources cited supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (outlining various
regulatory solutions to climate change).
160 See, e.g., PETER HOWARD & DEREK SYLVAN, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, EXPERT
CONSENSUS ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2015), http://policyintegrity.org/
files/publications/ExpertConsensusReport.pdf (reporting survey results showing that 75%
of expert economists favor a market-based mechanism as the best and most efficient means
of implementing the Clean Power Plan).
161 A recent blog post and two popular press articles present excellent distillations of the
major objections to a stand-alone carbon price. See Brendan Haley, Ontario’s Climate Plan
and the Promise of Mobilizing Markets and Society, INSTITUT BROADBENT: BROADBENT
BLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/brendanhaley/ontario_s_climate_
plan_and_the_promise_of_mobilizing_markets_and_society; Mark Jaccard, Want an
Effective Climate Policy? Heed the Evidence, POL’Y OPTIONS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://policyop
tions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2016/want-an-effective-climatepolicy-heed-the-evidence/
(“Carbon taxes and caps may be most effective in economic theory, but smart regulation
will produce better climate policy for our political reality.”); David Roberts, 5 Reasons
There’s More to Climate Policy than a Price on Carbon, VOX (June 28, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/28/12045860/carbon-tax; see also JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., 2
U.S. 2050: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 81
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tions is beyond the scope of this Article, but let me note the most
obvious and immediate: The United States appears exceedingly
unlikely to adopt carbon pricing in the near future, and the few juris-
dictions within the United States that have adopted such pricing have
failed to establish prices anywhere near those necessary to induce
major decarbonization.162 Put otherwise, effective economy-wide
carbon pricing is politically a no-go at this point.163
Absent a carbon tax, or in addition to it, regulators might pursue
more targeted interventions within energy law. Regulators might, for
example, impose a carbon “adder” to the market price of all elec-
tricity that varies by source, so that the price charged in wholesale
markets reflects the carbon content of electricity.164 Similarly, they
(2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarboniza
tion_Policy_Report.pdf (describing the “important potential drawbacks” of “establishing
carbon pricing as the primary or only policy instrument” motivating decarbonization);
Alex Trembath, No, Really, Why Are We Waiting?, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 2015, at
90, 90 (reviewing NICHOLAS STERN, WHY ARE WE WAITING? (2015)) (“History reveals
that prices and scarcity have rarely, if ever, driven large-scale energy transitions.”).
162 A recent study of carbon prices around the world determined them to be “virtually
valueless.” Matthew Carr & Joe Ryan, Tough to Keep the World from Warming when
Carbon Is This Cheap, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-07-07/tough-to-keep-the-world-from-warming-when-carbon-is-this-cheap.
Current carbon markets in the United States price carbon far below what the Obama
Administration estimated as the “social cost of carbon.” Compare Auction Results,
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/
results (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (showing that carbon allowances in the northeastern
United States sold for $4.53 per ton in the June 2016 auction), and CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM
AUGUST 2016 JOINT AUCTION #8 SUMMARY RESULTS REPORT 4 (2016), https://www.arb.ca
.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/aug-2016/summary_results_report.pdf (showing an average
price in the August 2016 auction of $14.39), with INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL
COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER, at 12, 18 (2013), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_ria_2013_update
.pdf (estimating a social cost of carbon of $36 for a metric ton of CO2 emitted in 2013 based
on 3% discount value). This “social cost of carbon” has, in turn, received criticism as itself
undervaluing actual carbon costs, due to its tendency to “limit[ ]the ambition of current
mitigation efforts based on unknowable future damage costs.” JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL.,
ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., INC. & DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, 2 US
2050 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (2015).
163 By emphasizing the political infeasibility of carbon pricing, I do not mean to imply
that I see this as its only impediment. I am persuaded by those thinkers who see carbon
pricing best functioning as part of a suite of decarbonization policies. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 162 (criticizing carbon tax as stand-alone solution). This larger suite of policies
should include measures that incorporate not only market signals but also citizen
preferences—arrived at through political processes—regarding the type of decarbonized
future we want to pursue. I intend to explore this issue further in future work.
164 See Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 23, at 1786 (proposing that
FERC’s regulatory powers could include the ability to impose a carbon adder to the price
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might create a “carbon intensity” standard that limits the amount of
carbon-intensive energy each utility can include within its mix.165 Or
regulators might redesign energy company compensation so that com-
panies are paid by the reliability of their energy sources.166 Or FERC
might require utilities to open up distribution systems to competition,
just as it did for transmission lines, in order to promote distributed
generation, energy efficiency, and demand response.167
However, many scholars are skeptical of whether policy makers
are capable of redesigning markets to achieve decarbonization on the
scale necessary. Emily Hammond and David Spence, for example,
recently explored why electricity markets are failing to compensate
nuclear energy appropriately, given climate change goals, and con-
cluded that the present push for ever more competitive markets is out
of accord with the goals of properly pricing externalities and relia-
bility.168 Similarly, William Boyd has argued compellingly that elec-
tricity markets are incapable of creating the investor certainty
necessary to stimulate the major experimental infrastructure invest-
ment climate change demands.169 And he is skeptical whether the
of energy based on its source); see also WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 23, at 3 (noting
that FERC could introduce a carbon adder to the market price).
165 Such a system would be analogous to Renewable Portfolio Standards, which have
been a popular strategy for promoting renewable energy. See Jocelyn Durkay, State
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx (last visited Oct. 20,
2016) (showing that twenty-nine states plus the District of Columbia have mandatory
renewable standards, which require utilities to provide a certain percentage of electricity
from renewable sources). California has adopted a carbon intensity standard for fuels
consumed in the state, although it has not extended the standard to electricity. See LCFS
Electricity and Hydrogen Provisions, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/electricity/electricityh2.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2016). EPA’s “rate-based” methodology for calculating state compliance obligations under
the Clean Power Plan is a carbon intensity standard, albeit one that applies to an entire
state rather than to each individual utility. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,667
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
166 See, e.g., Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 199 (describing how nuclear power
could be priced to more accurately reflect its reliability).
167 See generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 23, at 1814–17
(discussing FERC’s broad jurisdiction to regulate environmental and energy goals and its
use of this jurisdiction to regulate transmission lines).
168 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 193 (discussing the incongruity between
nuclear power’s high market price and its environmental benefits); see also David Spence,
Why Some Electricity Markets Will Struggle with Decarbonization, LEGAL PLANET (Mar.
22, 2016), http://legal-planet.org/2016/03/22/guest-blogger-david-spence-why-some-
electricity-markets-will-struggle-with-decarbonization/ (“Competitive electricity markets
may yet devise ways to price reliability and environmental performance accurately, but
right now they seem to struggle with that task in ways that complicate the decarbonization
of the electricity sector.”).
169 See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1683.
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“pathologies . . . that arise from the performance of the market under
political constraints” can be cured through redesign.170
The other line of proposed reform, best articulated by Boyd as an
antidote to his skepticism about the ability of markets to manage cli-
mate change, is a return to a more capacious understanding of what
the public means in public utility regulation.171 In his article Public
Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, Boyd demonstrates the ways in
which public utility regulation has always been a “normative effort
directed at ensuring . . . the governance of essential network indus-
tries,”172 and suggests that regulators might reharness public utility
law’s normative powers to respond to climate change. In particular,
Boyd argues for the renewed importance of regulatory planning,173
regulatory coordination of markets and the grid,174 and regulatory
experimentation.175
Boyd acknowledges that PUCs, pared down by decades of der-
egulatory initiatives, currently have considerably narrower responsi-
bilities than those he would assign them under a revitalized notion of
“public utility.”176 And PUCs, by and large, also lack the staff, exper-
tise, and resources to tackle this renewed vision.177 But he finds opti-
mism in the fact that several PUCs around the United States are
engaging in experimental, innovative projects to reform rate regula-
tion to address climate change goals, and he advocates broadening
these initiatives and creating the institutional capacity necessary to
achieve them.178
I will return in Part III to discuss the ways in which outsourcing
theory intersects with these proposed avenues of reform for electricity
governance. First, however, I want to describe two governance options
that have received considerably less scholarly attention: municipaliza-
tion and its modern corollary, community choice aggregation.
170 Id. at 1671; see also Griffin & Puller, supra note 114, at 9 (describing the reasons that
electricity markets struggle to provide proper investment signals to new generation);
Wolak, supra note 13, at 195.
171 See Boyd, supra note 22.
172 Id. at 1619.
173 See id. at 1695.
174 See id. at 1699–1703.
175 See id. at 1704.
176 See id. at 1649–50 (citing the judicialization of PUCs as a reason why they have been
less able to fulfill their more creative and proactive responsibilities and to act as advocates
for the public).
177 See id. 
178 See id. at 1704–07.
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C. Modern Energy Ownership: Municipalization Reborn
While states and FERC pursue these regulatory reforms with
varying degrees of zeal, impatient cities are turning back to municipal-
ization as a climate change strategy. Municipalization allows cities to
reclaim control over the goals and performance of their electricity
supply.179 In a municipalized system, either the city council or an
independent governing board or agency has direct control over a not-
for-profit electric utility.180 The council or board sets rates and estab-
lishes requirements governing utility performance, including energy
efficiency mandates, renewable energy requirements, and targets for
other aims such as local generation or the phasing out of coal-fired
power.181 As one city administrator recently described in explaining
the impetus behind a municipally owned solar-plus-storage project in
his village, a key advantage of municipal ownership is that “[w]hen we
see an advantage for the community’s citizens, we don’t have to worry
about what is best for shareholders.”182
More direct control—and the ability to channel city policy prefer-
ences on climate change directly into utility oversight—forms much of
the impetus for recent municipalization efforts.183 However, these
movements confront steep implementation hurdles. Although almost
all states nominally preserve the option to municipalize,184 the process
179 Cf. Scott Ridley, Local Government: The Sleeping Giant in Electric Industry
Restructuring, ELECTRICITY. J., Nov. 1997, at 13, 14 (“[W]hat local governments offer . . .
are forms that are publicly-accountable, non-discriminatory, nonprofit, subject to open
meeting and ethics laws, and oriented toward advancing economic development and the
public interest.”).
180 See, e.g., WALTER BAER ET AL., RAND, GOVERNANCE IN A CHANGING MARKET, at
xii (2001), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1189
.pdf.
181 For a description of how Austin, Texas has implemented such aims, see infra Section
IV.B.
182 See Herman K. Trabish, Inside the First Municipal Solar-plus-Storage Project in the
US, UTIL. DIVE (July 5, 2016) [hereinafter Trabish, Solar-plus-Storage] (quoting Donald
Harrod, the Administrator in the Village of Minster, Ohio), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/inside-the-first-municipal-solar-plus-storage-project-in-the-us/421470/.
183 Again, I should emphasize that I do not mean to assert that all—or even most—
municipalization efforts are driven by climate change. Many are driven by a desire to lower
prices. The observation that municipalization provides more direct control over utility
decisionmaking holds, however, irrespective of what the normative aims of a city takeover
may be.
184 See BRIGGERMAN, COSTINESCU & BOND, supra note 79 (finding a statutory right to
municipalize in every state except Hawaii and Rhode Island). Whether or not a state is a
home rule state, which vests local authorities with all powers not reserved to the state
government, see generally Barron, supra note 18 (discussing home rule), is thus not a
critical issue in debates over municipalization, given the explicit authority to municipalize
granted in almost all states.
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is complex.185 In most states, a city can initiate municipalization only
after a successful public referendum, which typically follows a legal,
economic, and engineering feasibility study.186 Successful municipal-
ization efforts also usually require eminent domain authority to force
the utility to sell its assets to the city.187 Even where this threat is not
carried out, it acts as an important backstop power during
negotiations.
State legislation may grant the public utility commission a role in
approving the substitution of a municipal utility for a privately owned
one.188 Commissions often play an obstructive role, given their central
concern with “the impact of municipalization on the financial health
of the [private utility] and its ability to continue to render quality ser-
vice to its remaining service areas.”189 Cities also often face limits on
their ability to finance a municipal takeover.190
To compound these legal challenges, utilities tend to fight tooth
and nail against municipal takeovers. Where a referendum is required,
utility opposition usually results in a vigorous public relations battle,
in which utilities often spend considerable sums to defeat municipal-
ization.191 This opposition means that “municipalization efforts are
typically expensive, both in monetary and political capital.”192
185 For those interested in more in-depth discussion of these complexities than can be
provided in this Article, see generally Outka, supra note 25 (outlining the legal regimes
governing and the various challenges facing a city’s municipalization of its utilities).
186 See Kelly, supra note 9, at 43.
187 Most cities possess eminent domain or similar legal authority to establish or acquire
an electric system. See BRIGGERMAN, COSTINESCU & BOND, supra note 79 (surveying each
state’s laws with regard to whether it can acquire, own, and operate an electric utility);
Saxer, Eminent Domain, supra note 9, at 1511–14 (discussing legal issues related to cities’
use of eminent domain to municipalize services).
188 See Kelly, supra note 9, at 45 (noting that state legislatures may grant a role in
municipalization to agencies, finance departments, or utility commissions); see also, e.g.,
City of Sheldon, 114 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 482, 500 (Iowa Utils. Bd. Aug. 2, 1990)
(rejecting proposed municipal takeover on the grounds that it would not promote the
public interest).
189 Kelly, supra note 9, at 45.
190 See id. at 54–55 (describing the economic costs involved with a municipal takeover).
191 See Alan I. Robbins & Stacy D. Gould, Traditional Municipalization and Duplication
of Facilities Cases: Background, Facts, and Status, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 155, 157, 159–60
(1997) (describing costly public relations battles between private utility providers and cities
seeking to municipalize utilities).
192 Id. at 157; see also David W. Penn, Competition, the Consumer, and Local Decision
Making: Public Power’s Important Role, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 1997, at 30, 37
(“[I]ncumbent private utilities are spending big dollars and exerting political and
institutional clout to block the formation of new public power entities.”); Martin
Schweitzer, The Establishment and Transformation of Municipal Electric Utilities,
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 1996, at 75, 79–81 (describing utility resistance in a study of five
municipalization efforts).
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Boulder, Colorado has advanced furthest towards municipaliza-
tion as a climate change strategy in the face of these obstacles.
Boulder has been quite explicit about its aims in municipalizing: It
views owning and operating a retail utility as essential to accom-
plishing its aggressive climate change goals.193 In municipalizing,
Boulder seeks to create “the utility of the 21st century,” which will
focus heavily on reducing energy demand and promoting distributed
generation.194 The city’s recent modeling efforts lead it to believe it
can achieve its aims while maintaining rates “comparable or less” than
neighboring utilities over a twenty-year time horizon, although its pre-
cise plans for doing so remain relatively vague.195
Boulder’s referendum process has placed certain limits upon its
municipalization effort: Acquisition costs must not exceed $214 mil-
lion, rates must not exceed those of the private system, and green-
house gas emissions reductions must be greater than those pursued by
Xcel Energy, the private utility.196 The city has begun negotiations
with Xcel for the purchase of its system, but the two have yet to reach
agreement.197 Concurrently, Xcel has embarked on a multipronged
legal strategy to block Boulder’s municipalization efforts. In 2014, a
district court judge halted Boulder’s efforts to exercise eminent
domain, ruling that it had to first obtain PUC approval because its
system served some residents outside city limits.198 The Colorado
193 See CITY OF BOULDER, CITY COUNCIL AGENDA ITEM: UPDATE ON BOULDER’S
ENERGY FUTURE MUNICIPALIZATION EXPLORATION PROJECT (2013), https://www-
static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/Dec17CCMemo-1-201312121106.pdf [hereinafter
AGENDA ITEM] (providing an update on Boulder’s initiative to municipalize its utilities to
move the city toward a low carbon future).
194 Id. (discussing the goals for Boulder’s future municipalized utility).
195 See CITY OF BOULDER, MODELING AND SAMPLE SPREADSHEET Q AND A 7 (2015),
https://www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/FINAL_modeling_and_cash-flow_spread
sheet_Q_and_A_with_FERC-1-201501121724.pdf (describing the city’s utility modeling
projects, including a model exploring the effect of municipalization on utility rates).
196 See AGENDA ITEM, supra note 194, at 2, 10 (noting that 2013 Ballot Question 2B
passed on November 5, 2013); 2013 Ballot, CITY OF BOULDER COLO., https://
bouldercolorado.gov/elections/2013-ballot (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (containing language
of Ballot Question 2E, which passed). Ballot Questions 2B & 2C passed a utility tax and
authorized the city to establish a municipal light and power utility. See 2011 Ballot, CITY OF
BOULDER COLO., https://documents.bouldercolorado.gov/WebLink8/0/doc/61095/Page1
.aspx (last updated Dec. 21, 2012) (containing language of Ballot Question 2B & 2C). They
also imposed the rate and greenhouse gas emission restrictions on the future municipal
utility. Id. 
197 See Boulder Files Petition to Acquire Xcel Facilities to Create a Municipal Utility,
PUB. POWER WKLY. (Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, Washington), July 28, 2014, http://
www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/PPW28July2014PDF.pdf (online newsletter noting that
Boulder and Xcel had been negotiating but had yet to reach an agreement).
198 See City of Boulder v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, No. 14CV30047, slip. op. at 11–12
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. filed Jan. 14, 2015) (explaining that Boulder sought to
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PUC recently rejected Boulder’s proposal to condemn certain infra-
structure beyond city boundaries, but granted the city leave to amend
its application to reach a different solution.199
Xcel is vigorously fighting Boulder’s efforts for an obvious
reason: A successful, climate-driven municipalization in Boulder
might induce other cities to act. The utility’s opposition may be close
to paying off. In June 2016, Boulder reported that it has resumed
negotiations with Xcel to find a settlement that improves the city’s
clean energy portfolio while stopping short of reclaiming electric grid
assets from the private utility.200
Xcel employed a similar strategy recently in Minneapolis, the site
of its corporate headquarters. In 2013, the Minneapolis city council
held a public hearing to consider adding municipalization to the
November ballot as a way to cost-effectively meet the city’s goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions thirty percent from 2005 levels by
2025.201 Xcel quashed that movement by use of an effective, but site-
specific threat: It let the city know that the $14 billion company could
not possibly retain its headquarters in a municipalized city, such that it
would have to move.202 Minneapolis instead reached what has been
called a unique city-utility partnership to find ways for the company to
bring more clean energy to the city, as an alternative to
municipalization.203
acquire grid infrastructure outside city that was “intertwined” with the city system, and
holding that PUC involvement was required).
199 See City of Boulder, Nos. 15A-0589E & C15-1360-I, 2015 WL 9595986, at *9–10
(Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 4, 2015) (providing interim decision).
200 See Boulder, Xcel Energy Acknowledge Settlement Discussions, CITY OF BOULDER
COLO. (June 8, 2016), https://bouldercolorado.gov/newsroom/june-8-2016-boulder-xcel-
energy-acknowledge-settlement-discussions (announcing Boulder and Xcel have started
settlement negotiations);Walton, Five Years in, Boulder’s Municipalization Fight Could Be
Drawing to a Close, UTIL. DIVE (July 5, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/five-years-
in-boulders-municipalization-fight-could-be-drawing-to-a-close/421709/ (reporting that city
officials and the private utility were in negotiations and that Boulder’s push to establish a
municipal utility may be in its final stages).
201 See Jake Anderson, Mpls. Holds Public Hearing over City-Owned Utility, TWIN
CITIES BUS. (July 23, 2013), http://tcbmag.com/News/Recent-News/2013/July/Mpls-Holds-
Public-Hearing-Over-City-Owned-Utility (describing the Minneapolis City Council’s
public hearing).
202 David Shaffer & Maya Rao, Xcel Energy Weighs Exit from Minneapolis Under
Municipal Utility, STARTRIBUNE (July 26, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/xcel-energy-
weighs-exit-from-minneapolis-under-municipal-utility/217034911/ (reporting the CEO of
Xcel’s announcement that Xcel would move its headquarters from Minneapolis if the city
voted to municipalize).
203 See Frank Jossi, Minneapolis Utility Fight Ends with Unique Clean-Energy Deal,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/10/17/
minneapolis-utility-fight-ends-with-unique-clean-energy-deal/ (reporting that Minneapolis
and Xcel were expected to reach an agreement which is the first of its kind in the nation);
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D. Community Choice Aggregation:
“Deregulated Municipalization”
Alongside these challenging efforts at full municipalization, a
movement in favor of Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) is
growing. CCA offers the distinct advantage of easing the administra-
tive and legal burdens of a city takeover: Whereas a city that munici-
palizes takes full ownership of the electric grid as well as control over
decisions about energy supply, a community opting for CCA only
assumes control over energy supply decisionmaking. CCAs continue
to contract with the private utility for delivery of energy and mainte-
nance of the grid’s distribution system—that is, the wires and equip-
ment that transport electricity supply to local consumers—and also
typically utilize the private utility for billing.204 The City’s responsi-
bility is limited to (1) negotiating contracts for electricity supply from
the wholesale market (which can include purchasing supply from par-
ticular types of sources); (2) deciding whether to own and operate any
of its own generation as a component of electricity supply (where per-
mitted); and (3) administering programs to manage and reduce energy
demand, such as energy efficiency, demand response, or incentives to
encourage distributed generation.205
CCA thus represents a middle-ground regulatory option that falls
somewhere between the state commission model and full municipal-
ization, as depicted in the schematic below:
see also Outka, supra note 25, at 143–45 (describing Minneapolis’s efforts to municipalize,
including its decision to enter into an energy partnership with Xcel).
204 See, e.g., Aggregation: Frequently Asked Questions, CITY OF CINCINNATI, http://
www.cincinnati-oh.gov/cityofcincinnati/news/city-saves-residents-163-on-natural-gas-bills/
aggregation-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (explaining that under
Cincinnati’s CCA program, consumers still receive bills from the private utility that reflect
both delivery and supply charges).
205 See What Is CCA, LEAN ENERGY U.S.: LOCAL ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK,
http://www.leanenergyus.org/what-is-cca/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (describing what CCA
is and how such a program would work in a municipality).
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Somewhat ironically, it is deregulation (primarily aimed at incen-
tivizing private competition)206 that created the opportunity for CCA
as an alternative to full municipalization. As states joined regional
wholesale electricity markets, cities gained easier access to affordable
electricity supply.207 And particularly in retail choice states, it became
apparent that just as private companies could seek to amass a con-
sumer base to serve, so could cities function as collectives of their indi-
vidual consumers.208 And because—as with municipalization—CCAs
do not have the same drive to make a profit as private retail suppliers,
they can choose to supply power in ways that meet additional city
aims outside of cost savings alone, so as to function as aggregators of
citizen preferences, not merely consumers.209 CCA thus allows com-
munities the same power as municipalization to determine their
206 See supra Section I.C.
207 See Kelly, supra note 9, at 47–48 (explaining how changes in federal law allowed
municipal utilities to obtain cheaper power).
208 Ridley, supra note 180, at 14 (calling local governments “natural aggregators”); see
also Peter Asmus, Power to the People: Local Governments Go Green, ELECTRICITY J.,
Nov. 1997, at 78, 78 (“[L]ocal governments no longer have to own and operate their own
electricity businesses in order to imbue electricity purchase decisions with community
values.”); Hess, supra note 75, at 1067 (“One of the outcomes of the post-restructuring era
of electricity in the USA is that the local level of scale has emerged as a site for contesting
corporate ownership.”).
209 Cf. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393,
1394–96 (1981) (arguing that people have different preferences in their roles as consumers
and citizens).
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energy mix and negotiate energy prices, without requiring the
“expense, electoral battles, litigation, and steep learning curve
involved in municipalization.”210
Along with these political advantages come some potential disad-
vantages in terms of control. The fact that CCAs do not control elec-
tricity distribution and billing is certainly part of their appeal. But
there are some ideas included within ambitious decarbonization
agendas—including the creation of microgrids211 and the integration
of significant levels of distributed generation into the grid—where
municipal ownership over the distribution system might prove impor-
tant in achieving rapid progress.212 CCAs relinquish the chance to
pursue some of these reforms. Nevertheless, perhaps enough can be
done within a CCA framework to make the administrative advantages
of CCA outweigh any disadvantages.
As in the case of municipalization, however, a city’s ability to
implement CCA depends on state legal authority. Seven states explic-
itly authorize CCA: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Ohio, New York, and Rhode Island.213 Outside these states, CCA’s
permissibility is uncertain. Where not explicitly authorized, the possi-
bility of a legal challenge on grounds of exceeding local authority
deters communities from pursuing CCA.214
In those states that permit CCA, an interested city typically must
first hold a referendum. If the referendum passes, all residents are
automatically enrolled in the CCA unless they choose to opt out and
210 Hess, supra note 75, at 1069. Hess might overstate CCA’s advantages in this regard:
Although CCA might lessen utility-community battles, it does not necessarily eliminate
utility opposition.
211 Microgrids “organize distributed generation technology into a closed, low-voltage
system that may address the needs of multiple users using multiple kinds of technologies.”
Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 559 (2010).
They are typically capable of being “islanded” from larger electricity grids, making them an
appealing option for creating a cleaner and more resilient electricity system. See id. at 569.
212 Utilities widely oppose distributed generation, and frequently make claims that the
grid cannot support large quantities of distributed solar energy. See Bronin, supra note
212, at 568; Shelley Welton, Clean Energy Justice, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 16–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748136
(describing opposition to net metering, which facilitates distributed generation).
213 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2 (West Supp. 2017); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
3855/1-92 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 134 (West Supp. 2016); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.20 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-92 (West 2009); 39 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 39-3-1.2 (2006) New York’s Public Service Commission recently authorized a
pilot program for CCA. See Sustainable Westchester, Inc., No. 14-M-0564 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015) (order granting petition in part for expedited approval of CCA
program).
214 Indeed, one of the reasons that Boulder chose to proceed with full municipalization
is that Colorado does not permit CCA. See Memorandum from Jane S. Brautigam, City
Manager, et al., to Members of City Council 21 (Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with author).
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utilize a private supplier instead.215 Then, the city—sometimes alone,
sometimes in collaboration with other surrounding cities216—contracts
with an electricity supplier to provide the city’s power within a given
set of constraints, and also often embarks on its own set of efficiency
and clean energy initiatives and/or decides to own and operate some
of its own generation.217
Many cities participate in CCAs specifically to save money.218
Cities, with their opt-out model, are typically able to negotiate lower
rates than competitive suppliers, who must sign up consumers individ-
ually.219 Both Ohio and Illinois have hundreds of communities partici-
pating in CCA primarily as a cost-saving device.220 One example in
particular stands out as a model of how CCAs can cut costs: After
deciding to transition to a CCA model in 2012, the City of Chicago
eliminated its program in 2015 due to the fact that the city’s private
utility option had cut its rates, making the CCA no longer necessary to
secure favorable prices.221
Many cities, however, seek CCA for reasons specifically related
to climate change.222 Marin County, California’s CCA—“Marin Clean
215 See Stephen Littlechild, Municipal Aggregation and Retail Competition in the Ohio
Energy Sector, 34 J. REG. ECON. 164, 164 (2008).
216 See id. at 165 (explaining that in Ohio, ninety-four communities have formed “the
largest community buying group of its kind in the nation”).
217 Hess, supra note 75, at 1069 (describing benefits of CCA).
218 Id. at 175 (suggesting that the main predictor of CCA participation is “the scope for
savings compared to the regulated price of the incumbent supplier”).
219 See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION 1, 4 (2006), http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-2006-082/CEC-500-2006-082.PDF (noting
that the lower costs of municipal capital financing make renewable energy, with its high
capital costs, more affordable for local governments than for privately owned utilities).
220 See Illinois, LEAN ENERGY U.S.: LOCAL ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK, http://
www.leanenergyus.org/cca-by-state/illinois/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (reporting that
“Illinois is the fastest-growing CCA state in the nation,” with over 650 participating
communities, largely due to “an average customer rate savings of 25%–30% on
electricity”); Ohio, LEAN ENERGY U.S.: LOCAL ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK, http://
www.leanenergyus.org/cca-by-state/ohio/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (“The largest
aggregation in the state, Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC), serves over
500,000 customers in 174 communities and has estimated that its customers have saved
more than $175 million since its inception in 2001”).
221 See Cynthia Dizikes, Chicago to Return Residents to ComEd, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 24,
2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-comed-
met-20150424-story.html. Chicago also proves a cautionary tale in some ways for the
purposes of this article: The city justified its decision to form a CCA on the grounds that it
could obtain both lower rates and cleaner energy. However, once lower rates had been
achieved by inducing competition with the private supplier, the city seemed unwilling
politically to continue its CCA program for the explicit purpose of procuring cleaner
energy than the state would require of the private utility. See id.
222 See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 220 (listing “[i]ncreased use of
renewable generation” as the first reason that California communities commonly choose
CCA).
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Energy” (MCE)—supplies over 50% of its power from renewable
sources and will increase that amount to 80% by 2025.223 Next door,
San Francisco is implementing a CCA in order to achieve “direct
responsibility and control over the GHG and renewable content of
those supplies.”224 Cincinnati became one of the first cities to boast a
100% renewable energy supply when it voted to replace private utility
Duke Energy with a CCA model in 2012.225 San Diego is now consid-
ering doing the same, to further its commitment to receive all elec-
tricity from renewable sources by 2035.226 Without CCA, one local
advocate explained, the city has “no ability to require [its] utility to
play along and achieve that goal.”227
In California and Illinois, CCAs are permitted not only to initiate
their own contracts for power, but also to develop power projects.228
This gives CCAs in these states the ability to invest in preferred types
of generation that might serve multiple goals. For example, Marin
Clean Energy has touted its CCA-owned, 10.5 megawatt, 49-acre solar
farm, currently under development on a local contaminated brown-
field site, as bringing 341 local jobs in addition to renewably powering
over 3000 homes per year.229
These climate-oriented CCAs are, to be sure, curated examples:
Nothing about the CCA structure inherently requires participating
communities to clean up their energy supply. Nevertheless, CCA
223 MCE, MARIN CLEAN ENERGY – INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN: 2015 UPDATE 8
(2015).
224 S.F. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, SAN FRANCISCO’S 2011 UPDATED ELECTRICITY
RESOURCE PLAN 9 (2011), http://sfwater.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentID=
40.
225 See Philip Radford, Cincinnati Dumps Duke Energy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28,
2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-radford/cincinnati-clean-energy_b_
1457224.html.
226 See CITY OF SAN DIEGO, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 35 (2015) (describing this goal).
227 Claire Trageser, Turning San Diego’s Electrical Grid into 100% Renewable Energy,
KPBS (Mar. 10, 2015) (quoting one local advocate), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/mar/
10/turning-san-diego-electrical-grid-renewable-energy/. Additional examples include Cape
Cod’s longstanding “Cape Light” CCA, which has an impressive track record on energy
efficiency, and Ohio’s multicommunity CCA, the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council
(NOPEC), which helped shift away from reliance on coal-fired electricity. See Littlechild,
supra note 216, at 165 (explaining NOPEC’s role in transitioning Ohio communities to
cleaner energy); Dina Rasor, Six States Have Tried Community Controlled Power: What
Works?, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 31, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/22800-
six-states-have-tried-community-controlled-power-what-works discussing interview with
Cape Light Compact Administrator); see also Hess, supra note 75, at 1070 (explaining the
mechanism by which CCAs are vehicles for transition to clean energy).
228 See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-92 (West 2015) (authorizing towns to both sell
and purchase electricity); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 220 (listing ability of
California communities to develop generation projects as a benefit of CCA).
229 Local Renewables, MCE CLEAN ENERGY, http://mcecleanenergy.org/local-projects/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
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empowers communities that do have explicit climate goals to exert
leverage in the electricity sector to make good on their pledges.
Municipalization holds similar appeal for cities that choose to
pursue—or are legally limited to pursuing—this more full-throated
but politically challenging option.
In pursuing climate change aims, these movements for public
control of energy resonate with the broad political and moral agenda
of early twentieth century municipalizers.230 Cities are again coming
to see public ownership as a way to respond to problems that the state
is not willing or able to solve for them. But to suggest that cities are
turning to public ownership largely out of concern over whether they
can otherwise meet their climate change goals raises a critical ques-
tion: Are cities just grasping for any available leverage, or are there
reasons to believe that public ownership is a more effective form of
utility governance in the climate change era?
III
CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY
OWNERSHIP
“I might call the right of the people to own and operate their own
utility something like this: a ‘birch rod’ in the cupboard to be taken
out and used only when the ‘child’ gets beyond the point where a
mere scolding does no good.”
—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932231
The history of municipalization illuminates why we might con-
ceive of electricity supply as long “contracted out.” As described in
Section I.C above, nearly a century ago, states—with the support of
privately owned utilities—opted for a model in which government,
rather than owning and supplying electricity itself, supervises private
actors delivering this essential service through what is sometimes
called the “regulatory contract.”232 Under this contract, private enti-
230 See supra notes 67–69 (discussing agenda of twentieth century supporters of
municipalization).
231 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address in Portland, Oregon on Public Utilities
and Development of Hydro-Electric Power, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 21, 1932),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88390.
232 Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 142. The regulatory contract is alternatively
referred to as the “regulatory compact.” See Lyons, supra note 22, at 1628. Some scholars
worry about the effects of referring to what is essentially a government-bestowed operating
privilege as a “contract,” pointing out that there is no reciprocal contractual obligation that
guarantees cost recovery. See, e.g., Ari Peskoe, Senior Fellow in Electricity Law, Harvard
Environmental Policy Initiative, Comment Letter for the Second Installment of the
Quadrennial Energy Review (June 16, 2016), https://epsa.energy.gov/qer-comments/sites/
default/files/final-upload/2016-06-30_950_2016-06-30_929_harvard_env_policy_initiative_
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ties accept government price regulation in exchange for a monopoly
franchise.233 Public utility law is, in essence, a long struggle to deter-
mine the appropriate parameters of this complex public-private con-
tractual relationship.234
City-led municipalization and CCA movements remind us, how-
ever, that continued private electricity supply need not remain a fore-
ordained conclusion in the era of climate change. Instead, these new
movements demand that scholars come full circle back around to the
question of the appropriateness of contracting out electricity.
Fortunately, administrative law scholars have now developed a
considerably more sophisticated understanding of contracting out that
can be used to guide this inquiry. This Part applies the insights of out-
sourcing theory to the problem of managing utilities under climate
change. It argues that public ownership may well be a preferable gov-
ernance model for managing the complexity of decarbonizing the U.S.
electricity supply. More specifically, applying the literature on con-
tracting out to electricity regulation yields two conclusions: (1) There
is a strong theoretical basis for cities’ decision to reclaim public con-
trol over electricity as a way to manage climate change, and (2) alter-
native solutions for reforming regulation of the electricity sector
within the existing public-private framework face difficult—and per-
haps insurmountable—barriers.
A. Old Choice, New Theory: Contracting Out Electricity
As described in Part I, even those who support the contracting
out of many government services recognize that some services are
inappropriate for outsourcing. The question here is how electricity
comment_-_regulatory_compact.pdf. I substantially agree with this critique, and by
employing the notion of a “regulatory contract” I mean only to point out that the shape
that state regulation has taken has largely resembled that of contractual management. I do
not mean to suggest there is an inherent contractual relationship between states and their
regulated utilities that exists outside of public utility law.
233 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 142.
234 Cf.  Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 382–83
(2006) (arguing that regulation of firms is coming to look increasingly like delegation in
practice); Moe, supra note 49, at 759 (describing principal-agent relationships between
bureaucracy and regulated industries). Some scholars might quibble with whether public
utility law is something different than “outsourcing,” given the complex legal regime that
controls the relationship between commissions and utilities under their oversight. But all
outsourcing requires “contract management,” which Steven Kelman defines as “efforts
undertaken after awarding a contract to obtain successful contractor performance.”
Kelman, supra note 20, at 171. Public utility law is a robust, complex form of precisely this
type of contract management. But cf. Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 50, at 579
(characterizing regulation as an “intermediate between public and private ownership in
terms of the associated transactions costs of government intervention”).
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provisioning fares under the terms set forth by contracting-out theo-
rists. This subsection takes the three basic criteria for outsourcing
established by John Donahue as representative of the general con-
sensus in the field235 and applies them to the field of electricity regula-
tion under decarbonization constraints. It concludes that there are
strong reasons to prefer government ownership of utilities under these
constraints, as the utility sector is facing considerable challenges about
how best and how quickly to respond to climate change.
1. Specificity
Until recently, electricity provisioning proved reasonably ame-
nable to regulatory specificity: Contractors could be directed to pro-
vide reliable electricity to a particular service area at as low a cost as
possible. Under climate change, however, the specificity of the task is
diminished. Regulators who wish to decarbonize electricity face a
range of complicated subsidiary considerations: How fast should this
transition occur, and at what cost? Is it worth being a first mover on
new technologies, or waiting until other regulators and utilities have
tested and improved new designs?236 How much reliability should be
sacrificed to integrate more renewable energy sources into the grid?237
How much should decentralized power be promoted?238 How should
we distribute the costs of the transition to cleaner energy?239 Elec-
tricity supply decisionmaking now turns on a set of ill-defined but crit-
ical criteria that U.S. citizens and consumers want their future
electricity supply to satisfy in terms of cleanliness, affordability, relia-
bility, scale, location, and risk. These criteria are impossible to maxi-
mize concomitantly, and therefore will require difficult choices about
the balance to strike as we implement decarbonization.240 This broad-
ening of aims renders the task of electricity provision considerably less
235 The three criteria are specificity, ease of evaluation, and competition. See supra
notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
236 Cf. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle: The
View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1348, 1359–64 (2014)
[hereinafter Monast & Adair, Energy Innovation Cycle] (discussing the challenge of PUC-
led innovation).
237 See Spence, supra note 146, at 279 (noting that renewables must be integrated in
ways that maintain grid reliability).
238 See id. at 270 (discussing factors contributing to the difficulty of these decisions).
239 See Welton, supra note 213, at 18 (discussing difficulties in cost distribution as some
users choose to install their own clean energy equipment).
240 Cf. Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 50, at 575 (“[I]t is not a trivial exercise for the
principal (government) to specify completely its preferences.”).
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specific, and more “ill-defined and changeable,” than it was in the
absence of climate change.241
Put otherwise, electricity regulation is exiting the realm of rela-
tively “complete” regulatory contracts, where most terms could be
specified in advance. It now involves “incomplete” contracts, where
many of the details regarding desired characteristics and outcomes
will have to be filled in as the contract progresses.242 Although we
have a reasonably good understanding of some of the tools available
to combat climate change, their economic and technical characteristics
have been in tremendous flux over the last several years,243 as has the
international and national political climate in which these strategies
are implemented. There is thus a certain lack of foreknowledge that
we must expect when it comes to decarbonization—decisions must be
made and revised in light of rapidly changing technical, economical,
and political contexts. Consequently, there is no longer a clean line
that can be drawn between the regulatory role of specifying desired
outcomes based on democratically (or bureaucratically) determined
policy preferences, and the instrumentally rational process of carrying
out these demands efficiently.244 In these circumstances, outsourcing
scholars widely agree that closer governmental control is advisable.245
241 See Donahue, supra note 20, at 44. Although conventional environmental pollution
already requires balancing these concerns to a certain extent, most of this regulation occurs
exogenously to energy law, and enters the calculus of regulation as a cost to be borne and
distributed. Climate change is forcing internalization of these considerations in a new way.
See Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental and
Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 182 (2013) (discussing how any response
to climate change must focus on fundamental changes to energy law).
242 See Hart, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 50, at 1128 (applying an incomplete-
contracts perspective to the question of government contracting).
243 For example, “[t]he price of U.S. solar power has dropped a whopping 70 percent
since 2009.” Christina Nunez, Solar Energy Sees Eye-Popping Price Drops, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/energy/2015/10/151002-
solar-energy-sees-eye-popping-price-drops/. Moreover, energy storage—which until quite
recently remained an unrealistically expensive, unwieldy technology—now looks poised to
become cost-competitive in many places in the United States. See PETER BRONSKI ET AL.,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., HOMER ENERGY & COHNREZNIK THINK ENERGY, THE
ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION: WHEN AND WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR GENERATION
PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE 6 (2014).
244 See Rubin, Possibilities and Limitations, supra note 38, at 913 (noting the distinction
for outsourcing theory between the instrumental rationality of implementing a policy goal
and the democratic process of setting that goal).
245 See, e.g., Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 50, at 580–81 (arguing that public
provisioning is advisable when “novel and complex” tasks require “rapid adaptation to
unforeseen contingencies”); cf. Hart, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 50, at 1141 (concluding
that private contracting may be inferior where opportunities for private entities to cut costs
by shirking on extracontractual quality measures are large).
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2. Ease of Evaluation
Climate change also affects the second outsourcing criterion,
“ease of evaluation.” PUCs have always struggled to know whether
regulated utilities are delivering electricity at the lowest rates possible.
Indeed, one of the longstanding critiques of rate-of-return regulation
is that information asymmetries allow utilities to exploit commissions
in rate cases and earn rates of return higher than necessary to cover
costs.246
Climate change is likely to exacerbate these asymmetries. Com-
missions rely upon regulated utilities to project future supply and
demand, monitor and assess grid reliability, and make determinations
about the optimal type and amount of new infrastructure invest-
ment.247 These are crucial decisional points for determining the shape
and scale of responses to climate change. But utilities also have supe-
rior expertise and information on these topics, including expertise
with respect to the grid’s ability to integrate renewable energy and
demand response without creating unacceptable blackout risks or
infrastructure costs. Because implementing such solutions frequently
cuts against utilities’ bottom lines,248 there are particularly strong
incentives for utilities to withhold or distort information relating to
the feasibility and cost of these climate change mitigation tools. These
differing incentives between regulators and utilities increase the diffi-
culty of evaluating utility performance under climate change.249
3. Competition
Competition, Donahue’s third criterion for outsourcing, has
never been present in the regulated utility sector. The very notion of
public utility regulation rests upon an understanding that competition
in at least certain segments of the electric utility industry is undesir-
246 See Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity
Distribution and Transmission Networks [hereinafter Joskow, Incentive Regulation]
(observing that regulated firms use information strategically, and that this problem may be
exacerbated by regulatory capture), in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, supra
note 13, at 291, 293.
247 See Scott, supra note 22, at 409 (describing utilities’ responsibilities under integrated
resource planning). Deregulated markets rely more on nonprofit grid management entities,
but these are agglomerations of for-profit companies that can withdraw at will. See
Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 116, at 562 (detailing conflicts created by the
composition of the boards of management entities).
248 See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1531 (2012) (describing
how utilities’ business model presents a barrier to reducing demand).
249 Of course, one solution to this problem is to reinvent the structure of regulation,
rather than resort to public ownership. For a discussion of this strategy and the challenges
it presents under outsourcing theory, see infra Section III.B.
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able, as it would prove uneconomic to have multiple companies repli-
cate the wires and poles necessary to distribute electricity.250
Of course, competition in the electricity industry has not
remained static: The restructuring of the 1990s made electricity provi-
sioning considerably more competitive.251 However, the electricity
industry remains only partially opened to competition: Transmission
and distribution remain wholly regulated, and even generation is not
competitive across the whole country.252 One of the benefits of munic-
ipalization and CCA today is that cities using these models already
draw upon the competitive sector of the electricity market by
purchasing wholesale power (often, specifically wholesale renewable
power) from the market. In contrast, those tasks assumed by the CCA
or municipal utility—retail supply, or retail supply plus distribution,
respectively—continue to be functions provided by noncompetitive
monopoly utilities in almost all parts of the country.253 This fact makes
it difficult to assert that competition in the electricity industry sup-
ports outsourcing of those tasks that municipal governments contem-
plate reclaiming.
Each of Donahue’s outsourcing criteria, as applied to the field of
electricity supply, thus points to the same conclusion: Electricity
supply under climate change constraints increasingly resembles a
“custom” task, unsuitable for outsourcing, and has ceased to be a
“commodity” task.254 The new regulatory mandate—to move with
appropriate speed from cheap electricity supply to affordable, reli-
able, carbon-free electricity supply—may well be, in Donahue’s terms,
a task too “intimately entwined with subtle and shifting public mis-
sions,”255 and one that requires too much creativity, vision, experi-
mentation, and balancing between multiple goals to fit within
outsourcing criteria.
4. Beyond the Classic Criteria
The extensive public law scholarship on contracting out gives fur-
ther reason to question the continued superiority of outsourcing elec-
tricity. Before widespread understanding of the consequences of fossil
250 See PHILLIPS, supra note 105, at 3 (describing why competition is not fully effective
for public utilities).
251 See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text (describing how deregulation of the
wholesale and retail markets increased competition).
252 See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (describing how some regions opted
out of regional markets).
253 Even in states that have nominally moved to a model of “retail choice,” competition
mostly remains limited. See Joskow, Difficult Transition, supra note 118, at 56.
254 See Donahue, supra note 20, at 46.
255 See id.
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fuel–fired electricity existed, citizens had limited reasons to invest
themselves in the choices utilities made about how to provision reli-
able, affordable electricity. Of course, there have always been public
controversies over where to site generation and transmission facili-
ties,256 and U.S. citizens have greeted nuclear power with skepticism
since the 1970s.257 But by and large, generation decisions have been
cost driven and the public has been quiescent.
In contrast, decisions about how to decarbonize require painful
choices among pursuing carbon-free nuclear energy and its many
risks; maintaining fossil fuel–based energy by adding expensive
carbon capture and storage, whose risks are not yet entirely under-
stood; and transforming the grid significantly enough to accommodate
substantially more renewable energy. Ultimately, science and tech-
nology cannot answer for us the most difficult questions about how,
and how quickly, to decarbonize, because making these decisions
requires value judgments related to our risk tolerance and our regard
for others.258 These questions about the future of society’s energy
supply are worthy of greater democratic deliberation and political
control than past decisions that merely aimed to balance electricity
supply and demand. Because of their importance and the difficult
trade-offs they require, we likely do not want these decisions driven
predominantly by the market or by private companies.
Attention to the accountability literature amplifies this point. As
cities consider municipalization, they are contemplating a shift within
modes of accountability. They seek to shift from the market, or
market-like, accountability of state and federal regulation to a greater
degree of political accountability, which municipalization and CCA
provide through their public governance structures.259 This shift in
modes of accountability may be advisable given the expanding set of
goals facing electricity regulators. As Mashaw has noted, the market
works best as an accountability tool when efficiency is the primary
normative aim260—as it often was in electricity regulation last cen-
256 See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1830–31, 1836 (2012)
(discussing siting issues).
257 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 22, at 185.
258 See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational
Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 ENVTL. VALUES 397, 397–98 (2006)
(arguing that “[t]he relevance of ethics to substantive climate policy” is clear).
259 See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 120–24 (describing public governance accountability
regimes); see also Kelman, supra note 20, at 158 (noting that public agencies face pressures
from the media and the political system, rather than from the marketplace).
260 See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 122, 133. But see Welton, supra note 213, at 42–43
(suggesting electricity regulation has never been limited to the aim of efficiency alone).
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tury.261 Political accountability is far more appropriate when there is a
disparate set of goals to balance, as there is under decarbonization.262
The importation of the outsourcing literature into the energy reg-
ulatory context illuminates reasons why municipalization and CCA
are strategically sound options for cities to use in addressing climate
change. Although government oversight of private utilities worked
reasonably well to achieve the aims of the last century, public control
may prove better suited to managing the complex, hard-to-specify,
hard-to-evaluate task of radically transforming the electricity sector to
respond to climate change. In turning to more public forms of elec-
tricity governance, cities are first movers in adapting regulatory
models for changing circumstances.
B. Outsourcing Theory and Alternative Regulatory Structures
In addition to highlighting the theoretical appeal of municipaliza-
tion and CCA in the era of climate change, outsourcing theory offers
insights into why alternative proposals for reforming electricity regu-
lation may falter. As outlined above, scholars have suggested two
dominant strands of reform for electricity regulation in the climate
change era: better incorporating decarbonization aims into electricity
markets, or giving state regulators more capacious authority to imple-
ment decarbonization goals.
Outsourcing theory reinforces scholarly skepticism about the
ability of redesigned electricity markets to meet decarbonization
goals.263 Of course, in speaking of electricity markets, we are dis-
cussing a highly managed market environment, in which market man-
agers carefully balance electricity supply and demand down to the
very second, price electricity according to nodes of demand and
supply, and monitor participants to ensure the absence of “market
power.”264 Electricity markets are thus very much regulatory crea-
tures themselves, which require considerable effort in their up-front
design.
261 See supra notes 63–69 (describing the motivations for the push towards
municipalization, including the relative inefficiency of private municipalities vis-à-vis
publicly owned municipalities).
262 Cf. DONAHUE, DECISION, supra note 57, at 12 (defining “accountability” as “fidelity
to the public’s values”); Mashaw, supra note 51, at 153 (describing how public governance
accountability regimes “reinforce the normative commitments of the political system”).
263 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
264 For more details on the formation of modern electricity markets, see Boyd &
Carlson, supra note 22, at 820–21.
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These markets function best when they have a stable backdrop of
rules under which private competition can flourish.265 But to function
effectively in sending these types of stable investment signals, markets
demand ex ante design specificity in Donahue’s sense of the term.266 If
politicians and regulators are in fact uncertain as to the pace and
desired parameters of decarbonization—and if reaching these conclu-
sions will take iterative, experimental regulation, responsive to demo-
cratic concerns—then electricity markets will prove an inadequate
way to accomplish the task.267
Moreover, markets are ill suited to creating holistic solutions that
balance today’s objectives with the realities of tomorrow. As Kathe-
rine Trisolini argues, our infrastructure solutions for climate change
should be attuned not only to the challenge of decreasing carbon pol-
lution, but also to the challenge of living in a future where, inevitably
at this point, significant climate change and related disasters will
occur.268 Although private companies have some reasons to consider
potential future conditions, they will not have incentives to consider
the full costs of their technological choices, given that many of the
costs of future system failure—e.g., blackouts, nuclear disaster, etc.—
will fall on the public more broadly.269
Even if electricity market design could theoretically incorporate
adequately specific decarbonization parameters, we might also worry
about whether, as a political matter, sufficiently stringent signals could
be put in place. Electricity market designers, working under political
constraints, have a poor track record of creating markets that allow
prices to fluctuate to the degree necessary to send proper market-
265 See Griffin & Puller, supra note 114, at 19 (“Regulatory uncertainty can stymie
investment, and better investment is the major theoretical upside of restructuring.”).
266 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (providing Donahue’s definition of
specificity).
267 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 826–27 (explaining why states without
restructuring can exert greater control over electricity generation and reliability); David
Newbery, Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to Meet Environmental Targets 4–6
(Univ. of Cambridge Elec. Policy Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1126 & Cambridge
Working Paper in Econ. 1154, 2011) (explaining how the United Kingdom reached the
conclusion that “the electricity market was not well suited to delivering secure, sustainable
and affordable electricity”).
268 See Katherine Trisolini, Holistic Climate Change Governance: Towards Mitigation
and Adaptation Synthesis, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 615, 650 (2014) [hereinafter Trisolini,
Holistic Climate Change Governance] (arguing that future vulnerabilities “weigh[ ]against
large-scale, centralized power plants that rely on vulnerable long-range transmission or
long-distance fuel transportation”).
269 See id. at 676 (explaining how current nuclear energy regulations allow industry to
externalize risks onto agencies).
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based signals to buyers and sellers.270 Instead, they have typically
opted for greater consumer protection and less volatility than eco-
nomic theory would suggest.271 As David Spence chronicles in his
article Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, politicians fre-
quently place legal constraints on the restructuring of the U.S. elec-
tricity sector, often requiring that it be accompanied by the guarantee
of lower rates.272 But immediate requirements of lower rates typically
do not allow for the kind of market price fluctuations that many pro-
ponents of restructuring believe are necessary to send long-term price
signals capable of balancing supply and demand cost-effectively.273
Consequently, in their quest to protect consumers and maintain
affordability, regulators and politicians frequently distort “true”
market signals about the relative value of supply and demand at
various locations and times.274
Given this history, we might have limited confidence that policy
makers will be willing to impose market signals strong enough to
accomplish necessary decarbonization objectives.275 Moreover, elec-
tricity market redesign can at best be a partial solution, given that
transmission and distribution will necessarily remain regulated
monopolies.276
Calls for regulatory reform, resting on the conclusion that a more
public turn in utility regulation is necessary,277 are far more persuasive
than the notion that reengineered markets can deliver a decarbonized
future with which U.S. citizens are satisfied. But outsourcing theory
offers several insights into why the reinvigoration or reinvention of
public utility law might prove to be a more challenging endeavor than
reassuming more direct public control over utilities.
In its traditional form, public utility regulation holds utilities
accountable in limited ways: Utilities are responsible for delivering
power to all consumers within a service territory at a particular price,
270 See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 765, 800 (2008) (discussing how electricity demand is less price elastic in short-term
situations).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 794–804.
273 Id. at 802.
274 See id. I place “true” in quotation marks because, as noted above, even if wholesale
electricity markets were allowed to fluctuate more drastically, the market is still heavily
managed and thus strays from a neoclassical concept of the free market by necessity.
275 See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1692.
276 See supra Section I.C. (discussing structure of market model and potetial monopolies
as a downside).
277 See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1708 (“A key task is to recover the public in public utility
as we confront the challenge of collectively building a low-carbon future.”).
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set by a commission.278 Typically, commissions also provide some sort
of incentive to utilities to maintain a certain level of service reliability,
since utilities would otherwise be tempted to skimp on quality of ser-
vice in order to cut costs and increase profits.279
As numerous scholars and regulators have observed, this regula-
tory model creates natural and severe disincentives for utilities to
cooperate with regulators on the goals that climate change demands:
selling less electricity, building less infrastructure, and converting to
nontraditional sources of electricity with more dispersed ownership.280
Under a traditional model, these reforms equate to less revenue and
more hassle for utilities, making them natural opponents of reform.
Innovative PUCs have attempted to cope with these challenges
by adding layers of incentives and mandates to traditional rate-of-
return utility regulation. Many have mandated that utilities source a
specific quantity of their electricity from renewable sources, allowing
for extra resulting costs to be recovered in rates.281 At the same time,
they have reformed ratemaking itself in two important ways: First,
they have “decoupled” revenues from volumes of sales, guaranteeing
utilities a certain level of revenue irrespective of whether sales
increase or decrease.282 Decoupling eliminates at least some of the
incentive that utilities have to oppose programs like energy efficiency
and demand response, which lower their overall sales volume.283 But
278 See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 3 (1988) (describing the four principal components that distinguish public
utilities from other sectors of the economy: control of entry, price-fixing, prescription of
quality and conditions of service, and an obligation to serve all applicants under reasonable
conditions).
279 See Joskow, Incentive Regulation, supra note 247, at 291 (describing this
phenomenon).
280 See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 249 (discussing these disincentives); see
also STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND
UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS 21–23 (2015) (explaining the insufficiency of continued cost-of-
service regulation); cf. Bamberger, supra note 235, at 399 (arguing that private firms have
“particular incentives to exploit the ‘slack’ inherent” in any delegations to them).
281 Twenty-nine states and Washington, D.C., utilize “Renewable Portfolio Standards”
(RPS), which require utilities to obtain an annually increasing percentage of their power
from renewable sources. See DSIRE, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf.
282 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND
DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 8–10 (2011), http://www.raponline
.org/document/download/id/861 (describing how decoupling works). In contrast, under
traditional rate-of-return regulation, commissions establish a “per-kilowatt-hour” rate that
utilities charge consumers, thus making the utility’s overall revenue dependent on the
volume of sales. Id. at 2–8.
283 Although decoupling severs the direct link between revenue and sales, utilities may
still oppose it to the extent that it lowers overall necessary infrastructure investments.
STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 281, at 3.
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it does not provide any positive incentive for utilities to want to
engage in these types of programs. For this reason, many commissions
use “incentive regulation” to entice utilities to implement otherwise
unpopular programs or goals.284 For example, Massachusetts utilities
can earn up to 5% of total energy efficiency program costs for meeting
annual energy savings targets.285
These reforms are quite useful in achieving a certain degree of
utility buy-in to programs that otherwise cut against their interests.
But they prove to be quite targeted interventions, which dampen
utility resistance to certain policies without eliminating fundamental
regulatory tensions. Consequently, as new technologies and policies
come along that are not covered under these incentive programs, utili-
ties mount new challenges. For example, utilities are now battling the
proliferation of solar panels under state “net metering” policies.286
Net metering allows solar panel owners to run their electricity meter
backwards—lowering the need for utility-provided power—whenever
their panels generate more electricity than their household needs.287
Utilities have also resisted the promotion of rooftop storage, which at
mass scale could negate the need for centralized utilities altogether.288
Again, the most innovative PUCs are attempting to respond to
new public-private divergences with new spins on regulation. Most
notably, New York’s Public Service Commission recently opened a
proceeding dedicated to “Reforming the Energy Vision,” which will
transform utilities into electric grid coordinators rather than electricity
providers, thus radically changing the way in which they earn
profits.289 But precisely what shape this radically reinvented role for
utilities will take remains murky and untested. In May 2016, New
York’s Commission released a 170-page order detailing a new busi-
ness model for utilities in the state.290 The new system sounds
284 See generally Joskow, Incentive Regulation, supra note 247.
285 See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES
WITH INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY at 6-3 to 6-4 (2007) (describing Massachusetts’s
shareholder incentives for meeting annual energy targets).
286 See generally Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015) (analyzing and evaluating utility opposition to net
metering programs).
287 See Welton, supra note 213, at 17. See also Rule, supra note 287.
288 See Glenn Meyers, The Looming Electricity Storage Threat Our Utilities Face,
CLEANTECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/04/looming-electricity-
storage-threat-utilities-face/ (describing electric utility opposition to net metering and its
effect on rooftop storage).
289 See STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 281, at 25 (describing the
framework).
290 See STATE OF N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER ADOPTING A RATEMAKING AND
UTILITY REVENUE MODEL POLICY FRAMEWORK (2016).
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intriguing, but complex. Utilities in New York will now have “four
ways of achieving earnings: traditional cost-of-service earnings; earn-
ings tied to achievement of alternatives that reduce utility capital
spending and provide definitive consumer benefit; earnings from
market-facing platform activities; and transitional outcome-based per-
formance measures.”291 Over the long term, New York anticipates
transitioning to a model that facilitates as much consumer participa-
tion in energy markets as possible, but the Commission recognizes the
long road it will take to get there and emphasizes a strategy of
gradualism.292
I commend New York’s Commission for its recognition that
incrementalism, experimentalism, and iterative solutions are
becoming a necessary part of utility ratemaking.293 At the same time,
this very recognition highlights why more public control over energy is
gaining theoretical appeal. Commission proceedings are long, ran-
corous, and costly; as their complexity grows, so does the advantage of
having a direct channel of public control over utility operations, goals,
and strategies, where public desires can be translated directly into
utility governance. Indeed, how elegant public control seems when
compared to a four-pronged, custom-tailored, often changing set of
utility incentives that must be continuously monitored and adjusted to
satisfy both public aims and private profit margins.294 Of course, local
politics can also be a messy business, but at a minimum, local political
control eliminates the profit-motive component of structuring the
community-utility relationship.
I use New York as one example of the more widespread phenom-
enon of utility commissions struggling to constantly redesign legal
regimes to keep up with utility discontents and disincentives that
emerge as the goals of electricity regulation shift in response to cli-
mate change. Outsourcing theory suggests we should be neither sur-
prised by this fact, nor sanguine about the possibilities for adaptation
291 Id. at 2.
292 See, e.g., id. at 22, 34 (explaining that New York is striving for a “power system that
is more nimble, distributed and consumer focused,” and that getting there requires “a
careful balance of immediate regulatory changes” and proceeding with “deliberative
caution” in order to “maintain[ ]the financial integrity of the electric industry”).
293 See id. at 38–39 (“[I]t will be critical as we move forward to constantly assess our
progress and be prepared to make changes in direction . . . if warranted by the facts.”).
294 On this point, many community advocates have expressed skepticism about whether
New York can accomplish its ambitious clean energy and climate change agenda while
continuing to give private utilities a central role in electricity management. See, e.g., What’s
REV Why Does It Matter?, AGREE N.Y.: ALLIANCE FOR GREEN ECON., http://alliancefor
agreeneconomy.org/content/reclaiming-energy-vision (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (worrying
that “the development of REV [the name of New York’s clean energy agenda] has been
highly influenced by New York’s investor-owned utility companies”).
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in this regard.295 The commission behavior described above is in
essence an attempt to import new types of specificity into the regula-
tory contract. Regulators now must specify not only price and quality,
but also a range of other values that have become important to the
public but were not reflected in the original regulatory structure. But
as these many recent state regulatory reforms illustrate, climate
change—and the experimentation that most scholars agree it will
require to decarbonize296—makes it challenging to adequately specify
a regulatory regime and utility business model that works for both
utilities and the public.
Innovative commissions are also struggling to evaluate what utili-
ties are capable of doing with respect to climate change, so as to set
appropriately stringent goals and calibrate rewards and incentives. As
noted above, not only do utilities have incentives to obscure cost
information from regulators, they also now have incentives to dis-
tort—or at least hold back—other valuable information with respect
to climate change. None of the regulatory reforms described above is
likely to alleviate these information asymmetries, which are inherent
to the public-private regulatory framework in a sector where competi-
tion is necessarily limited.297
I do not mean to consign commission efforts to train utilities in
new directions to the dustbin. To the contrary, to the extent that com-
missions have the capacity necessary to continually innovate in the
ways that climate change demands of them, these efforts will prove
valuable. But commissions are up against a formidable, persistent set
of constraints, including shifting priorities and goals, active utility
resistance, and a relative lack of expertise and information as com-
pared to their private regulatees.
Moreover, commissions in many states are confined by judicial
interpretations of their mandate to keep rates “just and reason-
295 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 36, at 315 (arguing that “[t]he constant effort to adjust
programs, regulations, and doctrines to changing circumstances” was the “undoing” of the
centralized agencies of the New Deal).
296 See, e.g., Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 814–15 (describing the innovation
necessary to achieve decarbonization).
297 Cf. Bamberger, supra note 235, at 381, 386, 399 (asserting that “information
asymmetries between regulated firms and administrative agencies . . . prevent[ ] effective
monitoring” and explaining the regulatory tendency to overdelegate discretion in the case
where outcomes are uncertain); Brown & Potoski, supra note 49, at 446 (explaining that
the biggest problems for principal-agent relationships are “information asymmetries and
goal incongruence between principals and agents”). Joskow does an excellent job
documenting why a shift to incentive regulation exacerbates information asymmetries in
the utility sector. See generally Joskow, Incentive Regulation, supra note 247.
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able.”298 Although some states interpret this phrase broadly to allow
for consideration of environmental concerns, many courts have read
this phrase to foreclose the importation of wider social goals into the
ratemaking context, which they see as limited to questions of
affordability alone.299 This legal constraint is likely to act as a check
upon the spread of climate-focused, commission-level innovation
outside of certain permissive state legal environments. Conversely,
this same check typically does not apply to city-controlled efforts.300
At the same time, it is important to recognize the check that state
regulation can play upon the possibility of shirking at the city, district,
or cooperative level. As noted above, although only a few states sub-
ject their publicly owned utilities to full commission regulation, many
include publicly owned utilities in certain clean energy requirements,
298 The mandate to keep rates “just and reasonable” is the cornerstone of public utility
commission regulation. Cf. James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen & David R.
Kamerschen, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (2d ed. 1988), 2005 WL 998333 (“A
public utility is expected to provide just and reasonable services to all who want them at
the prescribed, regulated prices.”). How this phrase is interpreted, however, varies state to
state. Jonas Monast and Sarah Adair explain that typically commissioners interpret their
duty to ensure “just and reasonable” rates to require pursuing the lowest possible cost of
service for consumers, thus creating a barrier for clean energy innovation that might have
long-term benefits but higher short-term costs. See Monast & Adair, Energy Innovation
Cycle, supra note 237, at 1359–60. One recent Kentucky opinion illustrates how “just and
reasonable” can prove to be a limitation for clean energy policy at the utility- commission
level: In Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Public Service
Commission, Kentucky’s Court of Appeals held that the Commission could not justify
approval of cost recovery for a biomass facility as “just and reasonable” on the grounds
that the state had a policy in place to promote biomass over other sources; instead, the
Commission should have balanced these policy considerations against “the reasonableness
of the rate increase proposed.” Indus. Util. Customers, Inc. v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No.
2015-CA-000398-MR, 2016 WL 3886312, at *11–12 (Ky. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).
299 See, e.g., Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(reviewing cases and FERC decisions and finding that, “[u]nsurprisingly, the Supreme
Court has never indicated that the discretion of an agency setting ‘just and reasonable’
rates for sale of a simple, fungible product or service should, or even could, encompass
considerations of environmental impact (except . . . as the need to meet environmental
requirements may affect the firm’s costs)”). Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth, and
Jason Rich argue, however, that there are typically at least some mechanisms within most
states’ laws to permit consideration of environmental matters within public utility
decisionmaking. See Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth & Jason Rich, The
Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, app. at
335–382 (2001) (cataloguing state rules regarding the consideration of environmental
impacts within public utility commission decisionmaking). They do not, however, focus
specifically on where “just and reasonable” rate requirements have been interpreted to
permit substantial restructuring of ratemaking principles to achieve environmental ends.
See id. 
300 See RAP, supra note 32, at 23–24 (noting that city utilities are generally subject to
control by city councils or a special board that may answer to the city council, rather than
by state regulatory agencies that regulate investor-owned utilities).
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such as renewable portfolio standards.301 State regulation can thus
serve as an important floor for publicly owned utilities in localities
that evince no desire to act on climate change.302 But for localities
ready to go above and beyond, attempting to reform the state com-
mission model to achieve climate goals that differ from those of state-
wide climate preferences is likely to prove a frustrating way to
proceed.
Thus, alongside commendable state experimentation with ways to
move various regulatory frameworks towards decarbonization,303 we
should give more weight and consideration to cities’ deployment of
more truly public forms of utility governance.
IV
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Any suggestion that municipalization and CCA may be theoreti-
cally superior regulatory structures for the climate change era is likely
to provoke skepticism among pragmatists. Even if the models offer
some theoretical advantages in addressing climate change, there is a
reason that private models won out last century across a range of
goods and services: Well-documented efficiency challenges plague
bureaucracy as compared to private enterprise.304 Local governments,
after all, aren’t uniformly known for their effectiveness and respon-
301 See supra notes 31 and 101 and accompanying text.
302 One might ask, in all this celebration of localism, whether we should also be willing
to let locally owned utilities opt to fall below a state floor on climate change, if this is the
locality’s political inclination. The powerful counterargument to this point is that climate
change imposes classic—and enormous—externalities that supply excellent justifications
for imposing regulatory floors on recalcitrant actors. See Lazarus, supra note 137, at
1160–61 (discussing why climate change is a “super wicked” problem); Richard B. Stewart,
Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199,
210 (“I think we must simply conclude, as a matter of fact, that many Americans regard
environmental quality as an important national good that transcends individual or local
interest.”).
303 Once again, for an excellent discussion of the regulatory experiments occurring
across U.S. states, see Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 841–81 (discussing how states use
their ratemaking powers to experiment with advanced low-carbon baseload generation,
grid modernization, distributed energy resources, and time-variant rates).
304 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1030–32 (2013)
(describing the efficiency rationale for privatization); cf. DONAHUE, DECISION, supra note
57, at 57 (noting that the promise of superior efficiency is the primary motivator of
privatization). Although efficiency stands out as the dominant rationale for privatization,
concerns about corruption, insufficient capitalization of public entities, and weak
incentives for innovation have also played a role in the preference for private companies in
place of public ones, particularly in the electricity sector. See HIRSH, supra note 64, at
33–35 (describing the characteristics of privatized but regulated United States energy
utilities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
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siveness.305 Given these disadvantages, it is reasonable to question
whether municipalities are, in practice, capable of addressing climate
change more effectively than state-controlled private entities.
This question is worthy of multiple case studies to reach a com-
prehensive answer. This Article focuses on making a theoretical case
for municipalization, leaving exploration of the practical questions it
raises for others. Nevertheless, without aiming for or claiming com-
prehensiveness, this subsection offers a sketch of why municipaliza-
tion and CCA’s advantages appear to outweigh their disadvantages, at
least in cities with local governments that prove responsive to citizen
concerns about climate change. To do so, it draws from two sources:
the economics literature on the relative efficiency of public and pri-
vate utilities, and a case study of one municipal utility outperforming
its private peers on decarbonization metrics.
A. Economic Disadvantage?
Many economists assert economic efficiency as private owner-
ship’s chief asset.306 Under this theory, private owners, driven by the
profit motive, have considerably greater incentives to monitor the per-
formance of their managers.307 Moreover, private owners are able to
avoid inefficiencies resulting from political meddling that injects
nonefficiency aims into management.308 In contrast, public sector
managers are hampered not only by such meddling but also by civil
service rules that impede them from attracting talented employees
and terminating unmotivated ones.309
305 See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and
Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137,
141–42 (2008) (“Citizens describe their experience with local government as marked by
apathy, frustration, and disenfranchisement.”).
306 See, e.g., Hart, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 50, at 1127 (noting that advocates of
government contracting argue that private suppliers deliver public services at a lower cost
than do public employees); Megginson & Netter, supra note 28, at 347 (reviewing
empirical studies and concluding that they “almost unanimously report increases in
performance associated with privatization”); Harvey L. Reiter, Competition Between
Public and Private Distributors in a Restructured Power Industry, 19 ENERGY L.J. 333, 341
(1998) (“An argument often advanced to support privatization of public assets is that
private companies are inherently more efficient than their publicly owned counterparts.”);
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 996 (1994)
(“[A] substantial body of empirical evidence documents . . . the superior efficiency of
private firms relative to comparable public firms.”); Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 49, at
117 (finding that “[o]verall, the evidence suggests that in competitive industries private
ownership is generally (though not universally) preferable on efficiency grounds”).
307 Cf. Shirley & Walsh, supra note 28, at 25 (describing how managers in public
bureaucracies are only motivated by efficiency to the extent that they compete with other
government agencies for the provision of government services).
308 See, e.g., id. (discussing this phenomenon).
309 See Michaels, supra note 305, at 1031–32 (reciting but not endorsing this argument).
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If this efficiency claim were true with respect to electric utilities, it
would certainly cut against the desirability of moving back towards
public ownership. A substantial efficiency advantage might suggest we
should prefer that privately owned utilities implement climate change
policy even though, as the previous section illustrated, they are harder
to manage in achieving climate goals. However, this narrative proves
complicated in the utility sector, where the choice is between regu-
lated monopoly and public ownership. In this case, several studies
raise doubts regarding the superior efficiency of private ownership.310
Indeed, the evidence suggests that public power is frequently cheaper
from an end-consumer perspective—that is, public power has a “rate
310 See DONAHUE, DECISION, supra note 57, at 76 (collecting comparative studies and
noting that “[n]o study even hints at superior private efficiency”); LAWRENCE J. HILL, OAK
RIDGE NAT’L LAB., ORNL/TM-10497 PUBLIC POWER IN THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY: REGULATORY ISSUES AND COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL INDICATORS ACROSS
OWNERSHIP TYPES 5-3 (1988) (finding that in 1984, publicly owned utilities had a lower
average price for end-use electricity than investor-owned utilities because of available
sources, access to capital, and regulatory issues); JOHN E. KWOKA, JR., POWER
STRUCTURE: OWNERSHIP, INTEGRATION, AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY 16–18 (1996) (reviewing the literature and finding that “a preponderance of
studies finds lower costs from public ownership rather than from (regulated) private
ownership”); Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-
Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1989) (collecting empirical evidence of relative
efficiency across industries and noting that there is “some evidence of superior public
efficiency” in electricity and water, likely due to the fact that “there is limited competition
or the private firms are highly regulated” in these sectors); Thomas Brom & Edward
Kirshner, Buying Power: Community-Owned Electric Systems, WORKING PAPERS FOR
NEW SOC’Y, Summer 1974, at 46, 48 (using Federal Power Commission reports to
demonstrate that public systems showed lower costs per kilowatt-hour than private systems
in 1971); William M. Emmons III, Implications of Ownership, Regulation, and Market
Structure for Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry Before and After
the New Deal, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 279, 279 (1997) (finding that for the period and
companies studied, “while state regulation reduced electric rates to a limited extent, prices
were even lower when utilities faced competition and/or were publicly owned,” but that
the “net impact of regulation, public ownership, and competition on technical efficiency is
ambiguous”); William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, Property Rights Versus Public Spirit:
Ownership and Efficiency of U.S. Electric Utilities Prior to Rate-of-Return Regulation, 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 414, 414 (1991) (analyzing “the relative productive efficiency of
publicly-owned versus privately-owned electric utilities at the end of the nineteenth
century” and finding that “for every measure examined, the municipally-owned electric
utilities were significantly more efficient than their privately-owned counterparts”); Reiter,
supra note 307, at 342 (“[T]here is no consensus that private electric utilities are relatively
more efficient than public ones.”); Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 49, at 117 (finding “very
mixed” results in empirical studies of industries with natural monopoly elements); John E.
Kwoka, Jr., Public vs. Private Ownership and Economic Performance: Evidence from the
U.S. Electric Power Industry 5 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No.
1712, 1995) (noting that the literature on cost function estimation shows that publicly
owned utilities more often than not have lower costs than their privately owned
counterparts because of greater access to low-cost hydro power, lower cost of capital, and
exemptions from most federal and state taxes).
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advantage.”311 The American Public Power Association, a municipal
advocacy organization, reports that today, “[o]n a national basis, pri-
vate power residential customers pay average electricity rates that are
about 13 percent more than those paid by public power customers.”312
Many question whether this differential is due to relative legal
treatment, rather than inherent efficiencies in public power. Public
power systems can borrow money using tax-exempt bonds, are
exempt from state and local taxes, and have preferential access to fed-
erally generated power, particularly from large hydropower facili-
ties.313 These differences certainly contribute to publicly owned
utilities’ rate advantage, but some studies suggest that they do not
explain the majority of it. Instead, one researcher notes that
“econometric studies show that 60 percent of the public power rate
advantage is due to the inherent nature of public power, principally,
its public service purpose, local cost scrutiny, and nonprofit opera-
tions.”314 And certainly, the fact that electric service provisioning
remains largely monopolized, without significant competition and
requiring extensive regulatory oversight, changes the efficiency
calculus of utilities as compared to other economic sectors.315
For purposes of this Article, no conclusion need be reached about
whether or why publicly owned power systems are more economically
efficient than their private counterparts. The relevant point is that
there is no strong argument that when it comes to electricity in partic-
ular, shifting to public power causes an enormous loss in efficiency of
traditional operations. If one is to dismiss municipalization as an
impractical option, it must be for other reasons.
311 See AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, supra note 98, at 1; Penn, supra note 193, at 33 (noting
that public-power consumers’ rates have typically been lower than private-power
consumers’ rates in large part because no dividends or profits must be added to costs and
paid to stockholders).
312 AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, supra note 98, at 1.
313 Kwoka, supra note 311, at 5.
314 Penn, supra note 193, at 34 (arguing that tax and preferential access to power make
up only a small percentage of public power’s cost differential). Note that most public
power utilities make “contributions” to state and local government in lieu of taxes, which
often amount to approximately the same percentage of revenues as private taxes. See id.;
see also Moody, Zummo & Beauchamp, supra note 99, at 90 (reporting that three-quarters
of publicly owned utilities make such payments).
315 See DONAHUE, DECISION, supra note 57, at 77 (noting that utilities are natural local
monopolies that, “if unconstrained[,] . . . tend to charge too much and produce too little”);
Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 49, at 116–17 (noting that competition can improve
efficiency incentives and identifying electric utilities as an industry with natural monopoly
elements).
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B. A Climate-Focused Public Utility in Action
Even if municipal electric utilities are reasonably efficient in
delivering on traditional goals as compared to their private counter-
parts, one might worry about their ability to maintain the quality and
affordability of their service while responding to the additional goal of
decarbonization. Can they really, in practice, balance this multiplicity
of aims and translate them into effective reforms?
The answer, at least with respect to a leading subset of municipal-
ities, appears to be yes. Cities with ambitious climate goals and pub-
licly owned electricity systems are using their control to great effect.
This section begins by describing one such leading effort—that of
Austin, Texas—and then relates its utility governance structure to its
success in decarbonizing electricity.
1. Austin’s Decarbonization Trajectory
Austin Energy has served as the publicly owned electric utility for
Austin, Texas since 1895.316 Today, it serves more than one million
residents in the Greater Austin area, making it the eighth-largest pub-
licly owned utility in the country.317 The utility is directly governed by
the Austin City Council.318
Austin Energy has a long-standing, self-celebrated reputation as
one of the greenest utilities in the nation: Although the population of
Austin has grown 80% since 1990, Austin Energy’s use of fossil fuel
electricity generation has decreased by 1.5%.319 The utility accom-
plished this feat primarily through aggressive “demand side manage-
ment”—that is, investment in the kinds of policies that private utilities
typically fight strenuously, as well as the purchase of considerably
316 Austin Energy At-A-Glance, AUSTIN ENERGY, http://austinenergy.com/wps/portal/
ae/about/at-a-glance/austin-energy-at-a-glance (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
317 Id.
318 This governance model endured through a significant public debate and series of
resolutions over whether to move to an independent utility board in 2013. See, e.g., Peter
McCrady, The Fight over Austin Energy’s Governance, COMMUNITY IMPACT NEWSPAPER
(May 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://communityimpact.com/2013/05/20/the-fight-over-austin-
energys-governance/ (discussing an April 11, 2013 proposal to the Austin City Council to
create an independent government board); Memorandum from Marc A. Ott, City
Manager, to Mayor and Council Members (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.austintexas.gov/
edims/document.cfm?id=187122 (providing a draft ordinance to create and define the
powers and duties on an independent board of trustees to oversee Austin Energy). Instead,
the City Council voted in May 2013 to create a Committee on Austin Energy within the
City Council that is charged with making utility governance recommendations. See Austin,
Tex., City Council Res. 20130523-071 (2013).
319 Investing in a Clean Future: Austin Energy’s Resource, Generation and Climate
Protection Plan to 2020 Update, AUSTIN ENERGY 1, https://austinenergy.com/wps/wcm/
connect/c0ef5620-bbb0-42ba-aa8f-eb8fadf7eb05/GenerationResourcePlanloresF0214+(2)
.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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more renewable energy from Texas’s independent wholesale elec-
tricity market.320 These investments in demand reduction also allowed
Austin Energy to go eighteen years without increasing base electricity
rates.321
The Austin Climate Protection Plan (ACPP), which the City
Council adopted in 2007322 and expanded in 2010323 and 2014,324 has
accelerated these accomplishments in recent years. The original ACPP
set the goal of making Austin Energy “the leading utility in the nation
for greenhouse gas reductions” by sourcing 30% of the city’s elec-
tricity from renewables by 2020.325 As early-stage implementation
proved the affordability and feasibility of its strategy, the Council
increased these aims, requiring that by 2020, Austin Energy reduce
electric demand by 800 MW through energy efficiency programs,
supply 35% of Austin’s energy needs with renewable resources, and
install 200 MW of solar energy capacity.326
Plans beyond 2020 have scaled up further: In 2014, the City
Council passed a resolution committing Austin to a goal of zero net
emissions by 2050,327 and later adopted a new Generation Plan for
Austin Energy setting a goal of 55% renewables by 2025.328 Because
320 See id. at 1, 3–4 (describing Austin Energy’s participation in the Electric Reliability
Council of Texas’s Nodal Market for buying and selling wholesale power, and listing Austin
Energy’s renewable power sources).
321 AUSTIN ENERGY, OUR ENERGY ROADMAP 15 (2014), https://austinenergy.com/wps/
wcm/connect/b08ba414-ce2f-43f8-a78b-676c5583ed73/
ourEnergyRoadmap.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [hereinafter AUSTIN ENERGY, ROADMAP]
(noting that adding units to an existing power plant in stages on an as-needed basis and
emphasizing energy efficiency and renewables allowed Austin Energy to avoid passing
costs on to consumers).
322 See Austin, Tex., City Council Res. 20070215-023 (2007) (establishing the framework
for the 2007 Austin Climate Protection Plan).
323 AUSTIN ENERGY, ROADMAP, supra note 322, at 3 (noting that the City Council
passed the citywide Austin Climate Protection Plan in 2007 and further expanded it on
Earth Day 2010).
324 Austin, Tex., City Council Res. 20140410-024 (2014) (noting that the City Council
established the framework for the Austin Climate Protection Plan with the passage of
Resolution No. 20070215-023).
325 See Austin City Council Res. 20070215-023 (establishing the framework for the 2007
Austin Climate Protection Plan).
326 See AUSTIN ENERGY, ROADMAP, supra note 322, at 3 (discussing adoption of the
Austin Energy Resource Generation and Climate Protection Plan through 2020 on Earth
Day 2010).
327 See Austin City Council Res. 20140410-024 (2014).
328 AUSTIN ENERGY, AUSTIN ENERGY RESOURCE, GENERATION AND CLIMATE
PROTECTION PLAN TO 2025: AN UPDATE OF THE 2020 PLAN 3 (2014), https://austinenergy
.com/wps/wcm/connect/461827d4-e46e-4ba8-acf5-e8b0716261de/aeResourceGenerationCli
mateProtectionPlan2025.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting that the plan uses revenues and
capacity created by a new highly efficient combined-cycle plant investment to allow for the
retirement of older fossil fuel generation and to support an increase in renewable energy to
55% of customer demand).
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of decreasing prices for solar, the City Council recently ordered
Austin Energy to contract for an additional 600 MW of solar energy
by 2019.329 Austin Energy notes that this acquisition will make it
nearly four times more renewable than Texas as a whole.330
Austin Energy has also pioneered an innovative solution to one
of the big challenges plaguing utilities with respect to rooftop solar:
how to compensate owners of solar panels at a rate that reflects the
value of solar power to the grid, while fairly charging solar panel
owners for the remaining services they receive from the grid.331 In
most states, including Texas, the prevailing answer has been net
metering.332 But whereas private utilities across the country are
campaigning to repeal this policy for the threat it presents to their
bottom line, Austin’s City Council has taken a different tack. It pio-
neered a policy called the “Value of Solar Tariff” that more precisely
compensates solar panel owners for the value they add to the grid,
while charging them separately for grid use.333 Solar advocates, regu-
lators, and utilities alike have hailed this solution as paving a way for
new best practices across the utility industry.334
2. Linking Governance and Success
This case study of Austin is only illustrative, not determinative, of
my theory’s validity. An obvious objection is that I have chosen one of
the most progressive cities in the United States for my example. But
Austin’s climate activism is precisely the point: I am interested in the
connection between a city’s popular will in favor of decarbonization,
329 See City of Austin Expands Leadership in Solar Power, AUSTIN ENERGY (Oct. 16,
2015), https://austinenergy.com/wps/portal/ae/about/news/press-releases/2015/city-of-
austin-expands-leadership-in-solar-power/ (noting that on Thursday, October 15, 2015, the
Austin City Council authorized Austin Energy to negotiate power purchase agreements for
400–450 MW of solar power, and also asked Austin Energy to solicit bids to build or
purchase an additional 150 MW of solar power to come online by the end of 2019).
330 City of Austin Moves Forward with Solar Power, AUSTIN ENERGY (Oct. 1, 2015)
https://austinenergy.com/wps/portal/ae/about/news/press-releases/2015/city-of-austin-
moves-forward-with-solar-power/ (quoting Larry Weis, Austin Energy General Manager).
331 See generally Welton, supra note 213 (manuscript at 20).
332 See Jocelyn Durkay, Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates,
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-
policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (“In June
2014, South Carolina became the 44th state to enact net metering legislation.”).
333 See Herman K. Trabish, Can a “Value of Solar Tariff” Replace Net Energy
Metering?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/can-a-value-of-solar-tariff-replace-net-energy-metering (describing Austin’s use of the
strategy).
334 The “Value of Solar” innovation led to Austin Energy being named 2012 Public
Power Utility of the Year by the Solar Electric Power Association. See Awards, AUSTIN
ENERGY, http://austinenergy.com/wps/portal/ae/about/news/awards/ (last visited Nov. 12,
2016).
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and its ability to accomplish its decarbonization aims. This project has
little to say about those cities that choose to lag behind, doing only the
minimum required of them by state and federal regulations. The only
relevant point with respect to these places is that should their will to
act on climate shift, and should this shift prove translatable through
the medium of local politics, public utility ownership may be one of
the most effective ways to move forward on tackling climate change.
Austin Energy’s impressive decarbonization trajectory illustrates
the necessarily iterative, experimental nature of electricity sector man-
agement under climate change. The city began with what it viewed to
be an achievable target in 2007, committing its utility to modest
investments in what seemed to be experimental renewable technolo-
gies at the time.335 The utility proved able to accomplish its goals for
renewable energy ahead of schedule, due in large part to major
changes in the market for renewable energy in Texas.336 During the
same period, Austin’s political appetite for decarbonization acceler-
ated, as the need for action on climate was revealed to be ever more
pressing by scientific reports and local weather disasters.337 And the
market for solar energy changed as well, as prices fell much faster
than expected.338
As these technological and political changes unfolded, Austin’s
City Council found itself able to adjust goals and expectations for
Austin Energy. At the same time, it has included an “Affordability
Goal” in its requirements, which commits to keeping Austin Energy
within the top 50% of Texas utilities with respect to affordability.339 In
this way, the city has iteratively arrived at consistently more ambitious
climate change targets, but found ways to balance these targets with
other aims. Similarly, its pioneering Value of Solar Tariff was able to
strike a compromise on reliability, equity, and the promotion of
renewable energy in ways that state proceedings struggle to do.340
335 See Austin, City Council Res. 20070215-023 (2007) (setting a target of achieving 30%
renewable energy by 2020).
336 See, e.g., ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEX., 2015 STATE OF THE GRID REPORT
21 (2016), http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presenations/2016/2015_StateoftheGridRe
port.pdf (showing wind energy’s growth in Texas markets over the last fifteen years).
337 See id. at 2.
338 See Austin, City Council Res. 20140828-157 (2014) (citing the changing market for
solar as a reason for enhancing solar requirements for Austin Energy).
339 See id. (describing City Council’s adoption of an “Affordability Goal”).
340 See infra notes 376–79 and accompanying text (describing why local experiments
“less hampered by state regulatory strictures” are better models for action to address
climate change).
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Austin’s model has now percolated up to state regulators, who are
using or considering similar policies in a number of states.341
Public ownership has been critical in allowing Austin to create a
utility that is consistently ranked as one of the greenest in the
country.342 Austin has made decarbonization a political priority, and
the governance structure of its publicly owned utility allows this pri-
ority to be communicated clearly to its utility, and to be iteratively
managed by political actors.343 To be sure, Austin Energy does not
have a frictionless relationship with its governing City Council: it fre-
quently takes the side of ratepayers in arguing for reducing risk and
managing expenses.344 But it does not have the same incentives to
spend considerable sums fighting decarbonization goals as private
counterparts, given its nonprofit status and the fact that it answers
directly to the City Council.345 Austin Energy remains accountable on
efficiency and economic grounds to a certain extent, because it oper-
ates on ratepayer revenues and makes an annual contribution to the
City.346 However, the links between City Council decisionmaking on
energy policy and Austin Energy’s rates and revenues are readily
apparent to council members and the electorate.
Fortuitously, many of the same activities that cut carbon emis-
sions most effectively—energy efficiency and demand response—also
tamp down electricity rates by reducing overall infrastructure invest-
341 See, e.g., DIV. OF ENERGY RESEARCH, MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA
VALUE OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (2014), http://mn.gov/commerce-stat/pdfs/vos-
methodology.pdf (describing Minnesota’s adoption of a value of solar tariff and
development of a methodology for its application).
342 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Top Ten Utility Green Power Programs, GREEN
POWER NETWORK (Dec. 2014), http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/resources/tables/
topten.shtml (ranking Austin Energy second in the nation in quantity of renewable energy
sold).
343 Cf. Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 50, at 567–68 (asserting that one of the great
benefits of public ownership is that government intervention is “less costly under public
ownership than under private ownership,” allowing government to “implement major
policy changes when it is deemed necessary to do so”).
344 For example, when the City Council recently considered how quickly to acquire solar
power, Austin Energy General Manager Larry Weis told members of the council: “What
you’re really making a policy decision on isn’t how much (power), it’s how much risk . . .
our sensitivity is how does it impact ratepayers?” Lilly Rockwell, How Much Solar Power
Should Austin Energy Buy?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Sept. 24, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://
www.mystatesman.com/news/news/local/how-much-solar-power-should-austin-energy-buy/
nnnLf/; see also MICHAEL O’BOYLE & SONIA AGGARWAL, IMPROVING PERFORMANCE IN
PUBLICLY-OWNED UTILITIES 8 (2015) (describing Austin Energy’s pushback to the City
Council’s original decarbonization aims, and the compromise ultimately struck).
345 See Wolak, supra note 13, at 231 (observing that under government ownership, there
is a clear incentive to cover expenses, but after this goal is met, the entity may choose to
pursue other goals over maximizing profits).
346 See AUSTIN ENERGY, LIGHTING THE WAY FOR AUSTIN’S FUTURE: AUSTIN ENERGY
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2013) (noting a $105.3 million transfer to the city’s general fund).
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ment.347 This outcome, anathema to privately owned utilities counting
on earning a rate of return on infrastructure investments, is more
acceptable to publicly owned utilities focused on covering costs and
meeting the political objectives of their governing council. Certainly,
this more political form of accountability, which emphasizes fealty to
elected principals rather than to profit,348 can allow some elements of
good management to slip through the cracks.349 However, it works
quite effectively when there is substantial political and media pressure
placed on a certain issue, as is the case with climate change in locali-
ties like Austin.350
Several other city-owned or city-run utilities could be included
alongside Austin Energy as decarbonization pioneers, including San
Antonio’s CPS Energy,351 the Sacramento Municipal Utility Dis-
trict,352 Seattle City Light,353 the Burlington Electric Department,354
347 It is for this reason that publicly owned utilities also proved to be pioneers in
implementing energy efficiency in the 1970s. Once publicly owned utilities had
demonstrated the value of conservation to ratepayers, regulators at the state level began to
require it of privately owned utilities as well. See HIRSH, supra note 64, at 155.
348 Cf. Moe, supra note 49, at 765 (describing politics as a “chain of principal-agent
relationships”).
349 See id. at 767 (noting that political mechanisms can “serve as partial substitutes” for
the efficiency communicated by market signals); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 307, at 996
(arguing that interest group pressures facing managers of public firms make them highly
inefficient).
350 Cf. Kelman, supra note 20, at 158 (noting that although publicly controlled functions
are not subject to the pressures of the competitive marketplace, they have their own
sources of pressure: politics and the media). Vickers and Yarrow observe that political
control is effective when a state-owned enterprise’s performance becomes a political
priority. See Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 49, at 115; see also Moe, supra note 49, at 767
(describing the “decibel meter” that informs politicians about the feelings of constituency
groups regarding bureaucratic performance).
351 See Marita Mirzatuny, Why Central Texas Is Becoming a Regional Clean Energy
Leader, GREENBIZ (May 23, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/05/23/
why-central-texas-becoming-regional-clean-energy-leader (noting that CPS Energy is a
leader in investing in renewables and in demand-side management); Who We Are, CPS
ENERGY, https://www.cpsenergy.com/en/about-us/who-we-are.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2016) (describing the services provided by CPS, its mission, and its history).
352 See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., Working Toward a Sustainable Future, SMUD,
https://www.smud.org/en/about-smud/environment/climate-change.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2016) (describing goal of cutting emissions to 10% of 1990 levels by 2050 and supplying
33% of power from renewables by 2020).
353 See The Nation’s Greenest Utility, SEATTLE.GOV: SEATTLE CITY LIGHT, http://
www.seattle.gov/light/greenest/cleanhydro.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (“In 2005, City
Light became the first electric utility in the country to achieve zero net greenhouse gas
emissions.”).
354 See Wilson Ring, 100% of Power for Vermont City Now Renewable, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/14/vermont-milestone-green-
energy-efforts/fsLHJl4eoqv6QoFNewRYBK/story.html (describing how “100 percent of
[Burlington’s] electricity now comes from renewable sources”).
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and the City of Aspen Utilities.355 All of these cities have climate
ambitions above those of the state and federal government, and they
are all decarbonizing their publicly owned electric utilities as a key
method of achieving these goals. Moreover, the first (and as of late
2015, only) four cities to reach 100% renewable energy in the United
States—Burlington, Aspen, Cincinnati, and Greensburg, Kansas—all
have either a municipal utility or CCA.356 Accordingly, as Austin and
others illustrate, the advantages that outsourcing theory predicts that
municipally owned utilities should have in managing decarbonization
can indeed translate into practice.
V
CLIMATE LOCALISM AND PUBLIC ENERGY
A. Why Local?
This Article has offered a defense of public ownership and con-
trol as superior management tactics, without addressing the scale at
which this ownership or control should occur. As it happens, and for
reasons related to history, legal structure, and politics, it is primarily
localities that are clamoring for more public control in the electricity
sector. In this Part, I specifically endorse this local control, as opposed
to public ownership at the state or national level, both for its ability to
harness certain cities’ willingness to take on an outsized role in tack-
ling climate change, and as a classic form of democratic
experimentalism.
Particularly within the United States, with its polarized climate
politics,357 many cities’ preferences on climate action differ from those
of larger political units. It is these city-level preferences that drive
movements for public ownership. Cities frequently ascribe to this fact
355 See Erica Robbie, Aspen Is Third U.S. City to Reach 100% Renewable Energy,
ASPEN TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.aspentimes.com/news/17972193-113/aspen-is-
third-us-city-to-reach-100 (describing “Aspen’s transition to 100 percent renewable”
energy).
356 See supra notes 225, 351–52 and accompanying text; see also Utility Services,
GREENSBURG, KS, https://www.greensburgks.org/residents/utility-services (last visited Feb.
19, 2016). Greensburg presents another fascinating example of the links between extreme
weather, values, climate change, and municipal ownership: after a 2007 super tornado
devastated 95% of the town, residents decided to rebuild the city as a model “green town”
within an “overwhelmingly Republican-voting county where a great many people are
entirely unconvinced that climate change is real.” See NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES
EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 406–07 (2014).
357 See Greg Sargent, On Climate Change, Ideological and Partisan Polarization
Hardens, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/
wp/2015/06/16/on-climate-change-ideological-and-partisan-polarization-hardens/?utm_
term=.35c1d71c547b (describing the wide “partisan and ideological divide over global
warming”).
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a claim of democratic legitimacy, as in this statement by former
Seattle Mayor Charles Royer: “[P]ublic ownership is not just another
way of doing business. . . . It represents the ability of people to control
their own lives in their own localities.”358
Whether or not municipal ownership translates into true demo-
cratic legitimacy is a question beyond the scope of this Article. It may,
but it also may be that the preferences of elites drive these cities’
ambitious climate change goals.359 In either event, cities active on cli-
mate change are taking steps that rational choice theory would not
predict: They are choosing to go above and beyond state and federal
requirements to contribute to solving a global problem that they,
alone, cannot possibly fix.360 Without delving deeply into the source of
cities’ motivation, we might still celebrate such altruistic impulses,
given the gap that exists between current national pledges on carbon
emissions reductions and the emissions necessary to actually stabilize
the planet.361
358 Penn, supra note 193, at 33. Similarly, Austin Energy emphasizes that “community
dialogue determines how Austin Energy defines its future.” AUSTIN ENERGY, ROADMAP,
supra note 322, at 6. And Boulder’s reasons for municipalizing include to “increase citizen
participation in democratic decisionmaking regarding their use of electricity.” Verified
Application of the City of Boulder at 9, Application of the City of Boulder for Approval of
the Proposed Transfer of Assets from Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. to the City & Associated
Authorizations & Relief, No. 15A-0589 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n July 7, 2015).
359 Compare Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1068
(1980) (arguing that cities serve as special sites in the quest for what Hannah Arendt called
“public freedom,” or “the ability to participate actively in the societal decisions that affect
one’s life” (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 115 (1962))), and Robert A.
Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 964–65 (1967)
(arguing that cities hold particular promise as sites in which to create robust, democratic,
and participatory politics), with Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We
(Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2025–26 (2000)
(reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS (1999)) (questioning the democratic advantage of localism), and Rubin,
The Myth, supra note 56, at 2104 (expressing skepticism that local government politics
evoke widespread participation). Jedediah Purdy takes a nuanced middle-ground view of
these movements, celebrating them not as true populism but as driven by “activists
aim[ing] to create new norms of climate regulation within small and rather insular
populations at a time when such norms have little purchase in the larger society.” Jedediah
Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119
YALE L.J. 1122, 1197 (2010).
360 See supra notes 26 & 213 and accompanying text.
361 Cf. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All
the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2010) (describing the phenomenon of
“federalism-all-the-way-down,” in which “localities serve as staging grounds for national
debates”). On the gap between national pledges and emissions reductions necessary for
planetary stabilization, see UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP
REPORT 2016, at xvii (2016) (“Even if fully implemented, the unconditional Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions are only consistent with staying below an increase in
temperature of 3.2°C by 2100.”).
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Local ownership allows certain cities to move faster than their
peers, acting as the vanguard of climate experimentalism.362 And
indeed, one of the key theories of local government law, famously
championed by Charles Tiebout, is that one of the major advantages
of keeping policies local is to allow people to “sort” themselves by
policy preference.363 Local utility ownership allows for a sort of altru-
istic sorting, where people supporting stronger governmental action
on climate can move to localities offering strong goals, while people
opposed can move away.364 And local action on climate not only
reflects preferences, but creates them: These city-level actions form a
part of a larger, dynamic national conversation about our role as local
and global citizens in an era of significant climate disruption.365
Local variation in climate preferences is likely to increase in the
future. Although the problem of climate change is global, climate-
related disasters are localized, and preferences for action on climate
change may be closely linked to personal experiences of the problem.
Boulder proves a case in point: As noted, popular support for munici-
palization soared after the city experienced devastating floods in the
fall of 2013.366 As more places come to personally experience climate-
related disasters, we may see greater local differentiation in prefer-
ences for climate change action, and we should seek ways to harness
this drive.367
362 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 36 (arguing for greater use of “democratic
experimentalism,” in which localities experiment in government service provision and
central regulators facilitate learning from one another’s experimentation); Sarah Krakoff,
Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 87, 107–08 (2012) (“In smaller communities, affinities of value, politics, and culture
can overcome the epistemological and psychological barriers that inhibit the public at
large.”).
363 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
421–23 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best
satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”).
364 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 36, at 288 (arguing that democratic experimentalism
can “change the reasons and evidence produced in public debate”); Purdy, supra note 360,
at 1198 (observing that climate change may in fact be an expression of citizen desires to
“(1) do the ecologically right thing and (2) form and participate in communities that do the
same”).
365 See Krakoff, supra note 363, at 87 (suggesting that environmentalism’s “resurgence
of localism” captures “expressions . . . of a planetary environmental consciousness”);
Purdy, supra note 360, at 1122 (arguing that “choices by municipalities to adopt the Kyoto
carbon-emissions goals” make sense as part of a larger argument about the relation of
humans to nature).
366 Boulder’s initial 2011 municipalization referendum passed by a narrow margin, but
its 2013 rejection of a utility referendum to halt municipalization passed by nearly 70%.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
367 Cf. Krakoff, supra note 363, at 87 (arguing that even environmental laws aimed at
solving global problems should “include elements that foster localism” in order to achieve
sustained behavior change and create at least some well-adapted communities).
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Another reason we might encourage local utility ownership is
because public ownership remains, for the moment, a promising
experiment in climate change governance, not a conclusively superior
form. Although I have offered strong theoretical reasons to believe
that public managers may prove more adept at transitioning utilities
to a decarbonized future, most are still in the early stages of imple-
menting their ambitious agendas. It might be wise to observe these
experiments’ progress a while longer before any state overhauls its
long-standing, complex regulatory structure in favor of a publicly
owned grid.368 Moreover, municipal utilities under the direct control
of independent boards or city councils have significant adaptability
advantages in the case that experiments prove ill-advised, thus
allowing them to be bolder in their experimentation.369
Moreover, it is likely the case that we need not achieve full public
ownership—and that full ownership is inadvisable—to fully decar-
bonize. Public ownership may reveal many of the impediments raised
by private companies to more robust climate action to be self-inter-
ested excuses. But a significant enough number of publicly owned util-
ities advancing climate change agendas should be sufficient to put the
lie to any overblown claims of impossibility or outrageous expense on
the part of utilities. It is hard to know precisely how many efforts at
public ownership this will require, but it is certainly less than one hun-
dred percent.
At the same time, there are also reasons not to focus on local
ownership or control of electricity as a stand-alone solution. Localities
suffer from two significant challenges due to their scale. The first is
that no city is an electric island—they are all interconnected to the
surrounding grid. Cities boasting 100% renewable energy take advan-
tage of this fact, by purchasing much of their renewable energy from
outside their local service area.370 At the same time, cities’ use of
368 Of course, one could also pile on valid political feasibility concerns about the
likelihood of state takeovers of utilities.
369 See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 483, 485
(2008) (explaining that “innovative high risk policies” are best implemented in contexts
where policy can be easily reversed, and that the pursuit of such policies is preferable to a
simple utilitarian welfare-maximization model in the case where learning is possible).
370 Typically, this is done through the purchase of “renewable energy credits” (also
sometimes called “certificates,” and either way abbreviated to RECs). RECs are
certificates issued by states to renewable energy producers, which can be sold separately
from the underlying electricity produced. See Kelly Crandall, Trust and the Green
Consumer: The Fight for Accountability in Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
893, 895–96 (2010) (“One of the most prominent incentives in the United States is the
renewable energy credit (‘REC’), a commodity representing the environmental benefits of
renewable energy and capable of being purchased by consumers or applied to state energy
portfolio requirements separately from electricity.”). Thus, a city can achieve 100%
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clean energy means that there is more “dirty” (i.e., carbon-intensive)
energy available for use outside of city boundaries. Thus, rather than
actually reducing carbon emissions, city actions—absent a comparable
emission reduction commitment at the state level—only displace emis-
sions, rather than eliminating them. Consequently, cities acting alone,
in scattershot fashion, will have limited actual impact on climate
change unless they work as examples for larger jurisdictions to
emulate.
A second problem of scale associated with city-led action comes
from the nature of the projects that cities are able to pursue. Meeting
the global challenge of decarbonization is likely to require significant
investment in large-scale technological innovations, like CCS, nuclear,
or utility-scale renewables.371 Municipal utilities are often too small to
undertake such projects,372 although they might at least promote their
construction by agreeing to enter long-term power purchase agree-
ments. For such projects to succeed, supportive municipalities likely
need state commission partners willing to commit ratepayer
funding.373
Municipalization and CCA thus offer the most promise as essen-
tially a prod, both to more robust state action on climate change and
to higher-level conversations about the possibilities for, and shape of,
decarbonization. Here, then, we can return to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
conception of public power as a disciplinary check on private power
and the state commission model, with each providing a “yardstick”
against which to measure the other.374 Under climate change, the
yardsticking function of competing ownership models gains power, as
renewable energy by purchasing enough RECs to cover its total electricity consumption,
without actually converting its electricity supply to rely completely on renewables. But
doing so essentially outsources renewable energy’s “intermittency” problem by allowing a
city to tap into nonrenewable sources during those times when wind and sun are not in
ample supply. To serve as full demonstrations of renewable energy’s potential to satisfy
demand, cities would have to fully internalize the challenge of providing a constant
renewable stream of power, which they might do by combining local renewable energy
with storage. See, e.g., Trabish, Solar-plus-Storage, supra note 183 (describing the first
“municipal utility-owned solar-plus-storage project” in the United States, in which the
Village of Minster, Ohio partnered with a private company to create a cost-saving solar
storage combination system for the village).
371 See supra notes 147–57 and accompanying text (describing these alternative
technologies).
372 However, municipalities working through Joint Action Agencies might reach the
scale necessary to pursue certain projects. See supra note 99.
373 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 880 (describing why ratepayer funding is
likely necessary for these large-scale experimental technologies).
374 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Yardstick Competition: A Prematurely Discarded Form of Regulatory Relief, 53 TUL. L.
REV. 465 (1979) (describing the theory of yardstick competition).
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the metrics that the yardstick must measure expand and the need for
iterative learning becomes more pressing.
B. The State Role
My argument is that local public ownership of utilities may prove
an effective component of helping cities to achieve their climate
change goals, which in turn may prove important to global climate
change mitigation efforts. If all this is true, then can scholars and offi-
cials at other levels of government sit back, clap, and let these local-
preference-driven movements unfold where they will?
The control that states exercise over their local governments sug-
gests not. “Dillon’s Rule, the traditional measure for determining the
scope of local power under state enabling legislation,” allows local
governments to exercise only those powers expressly granted to them
by the state.375 Not all states continue to apply Dillon’s Rule, and
many have adopted a “home rule” model, which reverses this pre-
sumption and grants localities the authority to govern all matters not
expressly reserved for state regulation.376 But even in these states, a
locality can rarely decide to publicize its energy without state-level
legal and regulatory proceedings. These proceedings allow state regu-
lators and policy makers to exert considerable influence over local ini-
tiatives, for good or for ill.
How state-level regulators approach questions of municipaliza-
tion and CCA depends on how they characterize these experiments.
Some might take municipalization or CCA efforts as a repudiation of
state authority or competence. This reaction, however, is misplaced:
Climate-driven efforts at more public control are more a reflection of
differing preferences across a state, as well as the regulatory con-
straints, discussed above, of state commission oversight of privately
owned utilities. As such, states struggling to determine how to meet
climate change goals might well view municipalization and CCA
efforts as welcome relief valves. These more local efforts—whose
costs are borne by a willing group of citizens, rather than the whole
state—can “count” towards state targets, easing the burdens put on
375 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990).
376 See id.; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1964) (describing states’
“resurgence of interest” in home rule); Trisolini, All Hands on Deck, supra note 14, at 694
(noting that local governments’ powerlessness is often overstated). David Barron,
however, complicates this picture, arguing that home rule “is not local legal autonomy,”
but rather “a mix of state law grants of, and limitations on, local power that powerfully
influences the substantive ways in which cities and suburbs act.” Barron, supra note 18, at
2263.
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the rest of a state’s populace.377 Additionally, these local experiments,
less hampered by regulatory strictures and private-public relations
than state regulatory structures, often provide models for later state
action, as with Austin’s “Value of Solar Tariff.”378
If state commissions and politicians come to view municipaliza-
tion and CCA as welcome experiments that both contribute to and
help shape state action on climate change, there are several steps they
might take to embolden their progressive communities. One of the
simplest ways to encourage municipalization or CCA is to clarify state
rules around the process. Although most states explicitly provide for
municipalization and allow cities to exercise eminent domain if neces-
sary, some do not make these powers apparent.379 For example, Santa
Fe’s 2014 push for municipalization was stymied by legal uncertainty
regarding whether New Mexican cities could exercise eminent domain
over preexisting utility assets.380 Similarly, although some have opined
that cities in states with home rule might have the inherent authority
to engage in CCA,381 it has flourished only in those states that explic-
itly legalize it.
Even where legal, municipalization and CCA efforts often falter
in the face of robust utility opposition.382 In Boulder, for example,
Xcel reportedly spent nearly $1 million trying to defeat municipaliza-
tion, outspending its supporters ten to one.383 In an effort to counter
377 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, San Diego Vows to Move Entirely to Renewable Energy in 20
Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/science/san-diego-
vows-to-move-entirely-to-renewable-energy-in-20-years.html (“As the city moves to
renewable energy, the State of California can begin to build its bank of carbon reductions
and contribute to global goals.”).
378 See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text (describing Austin’s Value of Solar
Tariff and its recognition as a new best practice); see also supra notes 344, 353 and
accompanying text (explaining that municipalities have also led the way on developing
energy efficiency programs and on fully powering their systems with renewable energy).
379 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
380 See An Ordinance Creating a New Chapter 29 SFCC 1987 to Establish Santa Fe
Public Power, an Electric Public Utility, City of Santa Fe, N.M., Bill No. 2015- ___ (2014)
(detailing the proposed Santa Fe Public Power); Daniel J. Chacón, Plan for City-Owned
Electric Utility Hits Snafu, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Jan. 6, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://
www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/plan-for-city-owned-electric-utility-hits-
snafu/article_9a1a32bd-544a-566c-9611-20fd4ae67660.html (describing the controversy
over the eminent domain power); Robert Walton, Will Santa Fe Be the Next City to
Municipalize Its Electric Utility?, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/will-santa-fe-be-the-next-city-to-municipalize-its-electric-utility/337072/ (describing
“efforts to form a municipal utility in Santa Fe”).
381 See Ridley, supra note 180, at 17–19 (suggesting that there may be preexisting
authority for CCA in more states than is commonly perceived, via traditional franchising
laws or other means of local control).
382 See Reiter, supra note 307, at 347 (describing the threat of litigation that hangs over
municipalization efforts).
383 See Simon, supra note 4.
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this dynamic, where a utility with market power is able to use its long-
standing relationships to squelch new competitors, California has
chosen to prohibit its privately owned utilities from spending rate-
payer dollars lobbying or marketing against CCA in communities con-
sidering its adoption.384 These regulations provide for a more
balanced public platform upon which to debate the relative merits of
public and private ownership. States wishing to promote more public
energy, or fair competition between the two choices, would be wise to
take note of this strategy.
Finally, commissions might consider using what legal interpretive
leeway they have to promote municipalization, particularly when
cities aim specifically to decarbonize. There is, to be sure, a legitimate
reason for state commissions to hesitate to champion municipalization
efforts: municipalization segregates the preexisting private utility’s
urban customers—who are often cheaper to serve—from its
remaining rural customers, who may see their rates rise due to the
city’s exit.385 But of course, this phenomenon only makes apparent the
long-standing fact that ratepayers in urban areas often subsidize the
cost of rural electricity. Although regulators may have good reasons
for maintaining certain levels of cross-subsidization, municipalities
breaking from state regulation in order to achieve climate change
aims perform their own public good for the state that countervails
these equity considerations. At the least, commissions should take
note of this fact during their rulings on municipalization efforts.
C. Beyond Localism
Even if these suggestions are universally implemented, significant
quantities of climate-oriented municipalizations and CCAs aren’t
384 The California commission was careful not to limit all private utility speech
regarding CCAs, but rather only misinformation and the use of ratepayer funding, which it
asserted allowed it to avoid any First Amendment complications. See Decision Modifying
Decision 05-12-041 to Clarify the Permissible Extent of Util. Mktg. with Regard to Cmty.
Choice Aggregation Programs, Rulemaking 03-10-003, slip op. at 11–13 (Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n May 4, 2010), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/PD/117347.pdf (proposed decision of
Commissioner Peevey); see also S. 790 (Cal. 2011) (directing the PUC to adopt such
regulations).
385 See Thomas Smidt III, Case Note, United Water New Mexico, Inc. v. New Mexico
Public Utility Commission: Why Rules Governing the Condemnation and Municipalization
of Water Utilities May Not Apply to Electric Utilities, 38 NAT. J. 667, 694 (1998) (arguing
that PUCs should consider the “public interest” outside the locality when authorizing
municipalization efforts); see also Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 49, at 120 (noting that
regulation has traditionally “suppress[ed] spatial (often urban versus rural) price
differentials”). Such cross-subsidization challenges are less of a problem for CCAs, given
that their consumers still contribute to private utility transmission and distribution cost
recovery.
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likely to blossom overnight. So it is important for commissions, and
those who study them, to take note of this Article’s central conclusion
for a reason unrelated to the ultimate success of these “public energy”
efforts. Delineating the role of supplying power as one that is increas-
ingly unsuited for simple profit-driven incentive controls, and increas-
ingly complicated to manage through periodic regulatory intervention,
also has implications for the evolving design of state regulation.
Detailed exploration of these implications will be the topic of
future work, but I offer here a few ideas about what commissions
might learn from the changing nature of electricity provisioning. If
public energy ownership or control remains elusive, regulators might
at least attempt to regain control over some of the most politically
fraught, challenging questions raised by climate change. Traditional
rate case regulation, in which regulators set incentives and then let the
utility proceed with limited interference until the next rate case sev-
eral years in the future, will become increasingly difficult as iterative,
experimental policy decisions within electricity planning become nec-
essary. Two other options hold greater appeal, given the constraints.
“Integrated Resource Planning” (IRP), in which regulators
require utilities to provide long-term plans for how to match supply
and demand into the future, has largely been abandoned within states
that have restructured.386 In these states, merchant generators decide
whether and where it is worth the risk of constructing new plants. But
as several other scholars have suggested, it may be wise to reembrace
IRP, or a new iteration of IRP, as a way for commissions to gain more
oversight of decisionmaking around decarbonization.387 For example,
California has recently required a new round of IRP of its private util-
ities. As part of the state’s effort to integrate more distributed
resources into the California grid, it is requiring California utilities to
file “distribution resource plan[s]” that “identify optimal locations for
the deployment of these resources.”388 In this way, California is har-
nessing its planning authority to more directly oversee the ways in
which its private utilities approach these new resources, which regula-
tors know present thorny incentive problems. Although such IRP
methods provide less direct oversight than public ownership or con-
trol, they get regulators closer to the policymaking role that out-
386 See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1694 (observing the decline of IRP in states embracing
retail competition, although noting that it has frequently been replaced with other long-
term planning requirements that focus on utility procurement decisions).
387 See id. at 1693–96 (explaining how “robust IRP processes can play important roles in
guiding utility investments and practices toward a low-carbon future”); Scott, supra note
22, at 378 (suggesting the use of IRP “to address long-term systemic risks”).
388 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769 (Deering 2016).
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sourcing theory suggests they should play, by sharpening their focus
on how utilities are approaching key issues, trade-offs, and
assumptions.389
Outsourcing theory also suggests that commissions might revisit
their tendency to set policies on a rate-case-by-rate-case basis. In rate
cases, individual utilities have strong incentives to scuttle innovations
that apply specifically to them.390 Many of the state commissions
achieving noteworthy climate-related innovations have done so via
more general rulemakings, rather than rate cases.391 This shift in legal
form, from adjudicatory to rulemaking-type procedures, may allow for
more satisfactory deliberation over the shape a state wants its future
energy sector to take.392
It is worth ending with the observation that perhaps climate-ori-
ented municipalizations and CCAs need not actually succeed in great
numbers in order to serve their purpose. Instead, what is needed is the
creation of a legal environment in which they have the potential to
thrive, as “birch rods” to be raised in threat against utilities that prove
recalcitrant on climate change.393 One need only look to Minneap-
olis’s experience in winning significant climate-related concessions
from its private utility to see how threatening, but failing, to munici-
palize might at times itself be effective.394 But such threats are cred-
ible only if states allow their innovative cities legal leeway to adopt
truly public utility governance as a climate change tool.
389 Cf. Herman K. Trabish, How California’s Biggest Utilities Plan to Integrate
Distributed Resources, UTIL. DIVE (July 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-
californias-biggest-utilities-plan-to-integrate-distributed-resources/401805/ (quoting a
private utility engineer who explained that the planning process “definitely allowed for
thinking with tools we haven’t normally used”).
390 See William T. Gormley, Public Advocacy in Public Utility Commission Proceedings,
17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 446, 448–49 (1981) (describing the “highly technical” process of
ratemaking where businesses present “formidable adversaries” and frequently leave public
interest groups unable to effectively participate); see also RAP, supra note 32, at 29–30
(describing the greater ease of participation in rulemakings as opposed to rate cases, and
explaining that stakeholder collaboratives further increase opportunities for reaching
“consensus on dealing with a major issue”).
391 In particular, for a description of ratemaking practices in New York, see STATE OF
N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 281, at 1–110.
392 Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking
and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163 (1986) (explaining that one of rulemaking’s
advantages is that it provides “wider notice and broader opportunities for participation”).
393 See supra note 232 and accompanying text (referencing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
conception of the public as a “birch rod” that serves as a check on utilities).
394 See supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text (describing Minneapolis’s failed
attempt to municipalize and subsequent clean energy deal with the private utility Xcel).
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CONCLUSION
Electricity regulation, long considered squarely a matter of regu-
lated industries law, may have much to learn from administrative law’s
attention to outsourcing theory. The converse is also true.
Scholars interrogating outsourcing have done an excellent job of
highlighting the ways in which the propriety of outsourcing extends
beyond a task’s particular characteristics. They have shown how the
outsourcing of certain tasks, and the accretion of outsourcing more
generally, risks “sacrific[ing] public values, achieving market effi-
ciency by using market ruthlessness.”395 In no small part because of
these critiques, official policy on outsourcing has shifted: President
Obama reversed decades of outsourcing policy with a 2009 presiden-
tial memorandum that raised concerns about contractors “performing
inherently governmental functions.”396 Resulting guidance called for
agencies to “be alert to situations in which excessive reliance on con-
tractors undermines the ability of the federal government to accom-
plish its missions,” and to consider “in-sourcing” those capacities
“essential to effective government performance.”397
These well-intentioned reforms face a challenge that electricity
governance over the past 125 years makes clear: we should not pre-
sume fluidity, or reversibility, in contracting out. The municipalization
battles now occurring speak to the difficulty of reclaiming for the state
functions that have been long outsourced.
This points to a larger problem in our scholarly analyses of out-
sourcing. As Jody Freeman has observed, much of our outsourcing
analysis—mine here included—is consequentialist, focused on
whether the consequences of contracting out are likely to be favorable
or not.398 But consequentialist analysis provides only a snapshot.399 At
the time of its outsourcing, electricity provisioning proved a task rea-
sonably suited to contracting out, at least under a regulated monopoly
395 Rubin, Possibilities and Limitations, supra note 38, at 927 (identifying this common
critique of privatization).
396 Memorandum on Government Contracting, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Mar.
4, 2009).
397 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, to the Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies, No. M-09-26, Managing the Multi-
sector Workforce 1–2 (July 29, 2009).
398 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 631
n.368 (2000).
399 Mashaw makes a related point, observing that contracting out may be difficult to
undo because the “‘meaning’ of certain issues changes from a question of collective action
to one of private choice or preference,” and because public sector capacities become
diminished. See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 137–38.
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framework: It was basic commodity provisioning, subject to econo-
mies of scale and in need of efficient delivery.
But fast-forward a hundred years and the story looks quite dif-
ferent: government’s normative aims have shifted in response to cli-
mate change. These shifts render the task of electricity provisioning
considerably less straightforward than it used to be, in ways that prove
challenging to manage under a contractual model. States could not
have predicted such changes in governmental aims at the moment
they chose to contract out electricity, rather than rely upon municipal
service, in the early 1900s.
Electricity governance, then, illustrates the risks of consequen-
tialist, point-in-time analyses of whether government should “make or
buy” particular goods and services. Societal preferences, exigencies,
and goals change, but outsourced functions may not be easy to
reclaim. This conclusion does not suggest that government should jeal-
ously guard all services in-house, lest it rethink the decision to priva-
tize decades in the future. But it does suggest that scholars and
regulators should give careful thought to the mechanisms and proce-
dures of outsourcing, to increase the fluidity of decisions made to
relinquish governmental responsibilities to private delivery. When
values do shift—as they have in electricity governance—and the
appeal of governmental provisioning reemerges, we should have the
ability to insist upon more public control.
